The Central Role of Credit Crunches in Recent Financial History by Albert M. Wojnilower
ALBERT  M.  WOJNILOWER 
The First Boston Corporation 
The  Central  Role 
of  Credit  Crunches 
in  Recent  Financial  History 
THIS  PAPER  addresses, from an unusual perspective, some key aspects 
of the interactions between financial markets and the real economy in the 
United States over the past thirty years. The emphasis is on the upper 
cyclical turning points in general business. The theme is to show how the 
credit bottlenecks that accompanied and in fact triggered these turning 
points prompted the removal of  the confining constraints and thereby 
shaped the cycles and inflation of the future. The vantage point is that of 
a trained economist who has spent nearly all this time in a ringside seat in 
the New York financial community-the  first dozen years in the Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York and the remainder in commercial and invest- 
ment banking. Perhaps some of the observations offered in this paper may 
eventually be useful in a more formal setting. 
The key observation, controversial though it may be, is that the pro- 
pensity to spend (that is, the demand for nominal GNP)  and therefore the 
demands for credit are inelastic  (or  at times even perversely positive) 
with respect to the general level of interest rates. The growth of credit is 
therefore essentially supply-determined-if  not always, then at least at 
those times that are cyclically important; and if not at every level of rate, 
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then at least at any level that the community on the basis of its experience 
has regarded as remotely conceivable. 
In particular, this has meant that cyclically significant retardations or 
reductions in credit and aggregate demand occur only when there is an 
interruption in the supply of credit-a  "credit crunch." Such interruptions 
may be  prompted, intentionally or  accidentally, by  the  destruction of 
lenders' incentives through regulatory rigidities, such as ceilings on the 
interest rate, or the emergence of serious default problems in major insti- 
tutions or markets. 
Following such episodes, however, the authorities (to avoid the conse- 
quent recessions)  and the private markets (to  protect future earnings) 
have  deliberately reshaped the financial structure so  as to  prevent the 
recurrence of that particular form of credit supply interruption. As a re- 
sult, subsequent cyclical increases in credit, interest rates, inflation, and 
general business have been able to continue longer and to reach greater 
extremes.  Ironically,  because  each  appearance of  unprecedently  high 
nominal interest rates has been viewed by the authorities and the market- 
place as foretelling recession (and lower rates), at such times both mone- 
tary policies  and lenders' attitudes have taken on a more expansionary 
bias.' 
Between credit crunches the changing expectations of financial market 
participants play an important part in determining the rate of growth of 
credit and nominal GNP. These expectations, however, tend to have large 
and mercurial short-run swings, are often inconsistent even within par- 
ticular enterprises, and appear to  be  influenced more by  extreme and 
memorable events than by slow-moving processes. Thus the desired stocks 
of financial assets change frequently and sizably, and in directions that 
may make little sense to the outside (and because of random components, 
often the inside)  observer. But because adjustment of actual to desired 
financial stocks can be  virtually instantaneous, especially as compared 
with the glacial  pace  of  the corresponding adjustments in human and 
physical capital mediated by changes in financial asset preference, finan- 
cial behavior becomes a routinely dominant force in business fluctuations. 
From this standpoint, the institutional changes of the last decade to 
free financial markets from kinks that caused crunches have also greatly 
1. Because of the major structural  changes in finance between most successive 
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intensified the propensity of the economy to excessive credit expansion 
and inflation. Innovations such as the deregulation of interest rates, the 
spread of loans with variable rates, the shift to an M1-oriented monetary 
policy, and the establishment of financial futures markets have in effect 
removed most financial "speed limits" on  the assumption that market 
forces will generate more rational and flexible limits of their own. How- 
ever, William Bagehot's terse admonition that "money will not manage 
itself" is only one of a long series of observations, traceable through the 
millenia of human history, that recognizes the narcotic attraction of bor- 
rowing and the related phenomena of gambling and asset-price specula- 
tion. At present, when the welfare state is seen as providing "catastrophe 
insurance" to  businesses  and individuals, and people  are having fewer 
children (which, having lost their former status as capital goods, are ap- 
parently also becoming too expensive as consumer goods),  the public's 
inclination to accumulate capital and to avoid risk should be diminishing. 
Thus one  may regard the liberalization of  financial regulation and an 
increase in gambling as a logical expression of the "now" generation. 
This paper presents a compressed history of the past thirty years from 
this point of view, pausing along the way to highlight the genesis of sig- 
nificant regulatory and institutional patterns that have grown to major 
current importance. Figure  1 summarizes the behavior of  money  and 
credit flows and interest rates over this period. A concluding section deals 
directly with the subject of expectations. Admittedly such a selective pro- 
cedure involves  a deliberate kind of distortion because many other im- 
portant developments outside and even within the financial sector will 
not be addressed. 
The 1950s-From  Liquifying Bond Portfolios to Disintermediation 
The United States emerged from World War II, it will be recalled, with 
a structure of  low  nominal and real interest rates rigidly controlled to 
minimize the carrying cost of the federal debt. The growth and allocation 
of private credit demand was regulated by a variety of official priorities. 
During the Korean War, mandatory as well as voluntary credit controls 
were  reintroduced, limiting consumer,  mortgage, and certain types  of 
business credit while giving military industry priority access.  Both  de- 
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Figure 1.  Fluctuations in Bank Credit, Money  Supply, and Interest Rates, 
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Great Depression  that preceded World War II and that experts feared 
might be repeated once the stimulus of military demand (and low interest 
rates)  was withdrawn. 
Financial institutions had little discretion over the size and composition 
of their sources of funds. What is today termed liability management was 
largely out of the question. Depositary institutions were effectively pro- 
hibited from deposit-rate competition with one another by various regula- 
tory  rate ceilings.  With branching also  sharply restricted, the  lending 
resources  of  depositaries  were  limited  essentially  to  the  incremental 
deposits  that they could  attract from local  customers and to whatever 
securities-essentially  U.S. Treasury obligations accumulated during the 
war-they  were willing and able to sell in the open market. The prevailing 
rate of interest was palpably below free-market levels, but existing rules 
to preserve the situation were difficult for the public and financial institu- 
tions to circumvent. 
In the early postwar years, a number of measures, including the cele- 
brated 1951 "accord" between the U.S. Department of the Treasury and 
the Federal Reserve, loosened the "peg" on government security prices in 
the effort to inhibit the propensity of financial institutions and potentially 
also individuals (although these latter remained quite "well behaved") to 
unload securities on  the Federal Reserve  and thereby cause  an undue 
expansion of bank reserves. Capital losses in government security prices 
were still taken seriously by many institutions. Although  they were no 
longer required to write down capital for unrealized losses, many bankers 
remembered all  too  well  how  bank  examiners during the  depression 
marked down assets and capital and thereby forced the closing of otherwise 
solvent banks. Given these and the Treasury's concerns, the authorities 
allowed  only  infrequent declines  in bond  prices and provided various 
cushions to soften the blows. In the second half of  1952, following the 
ebbing of the boom related to the Korean War, economic expansion and 
inflation reaccelerated sharply. By the then-prevailing standards, Federal 
Reserve policy was tightened, but it was questioned whether the tighten- 
ing would be effective if the authorities remained constrained by bond- 
market considerations. 
The pivotal event that severed the knot was the fledgling Republican 
administration's  decision to issue in March 1953 a new thirty-year obliga- 
tion that more genuinely reflected the underlying market conditions-the 
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mostly carried 21/2  percent coupons, fell correspondingly. It is difficult to 
recapture today the shock felt in the financial community at this startling 
devaluation of a major part of its assets. It was an environment in which 
many economists  warned that even  the smallest rises in interest rates 
might cause a depression and in which the most respected economic ad- 
visers of the banks had vouchsafed that the basic 21/2  percent government 
bond rate would quite literally never go up. On a rough calculation, the 
drop in bond prices in early 1953 would have reduced total commercial 
bank capital by 5 percent had their securities holdings been "marked to 
the market." Bank credit became scarce. Within just a few weeks, ob- 
servers could take for granted that a recession was now unavoidable; it 
began shortly after midyear. 
The shock did not last long. Quickly it became evident that the public's 
confidence in the banks and other financial intermediaries had in no way 
been undermined. The institutions learned that, within generous limits, 
they had little to fear even from losses actually realized through market 
sales and in fact deducted from their capital. The so-called lock-in effect, 
which some had viewed as the key linkage by which rising interest rates 
restrained credit expansion,  largely disappeared. The  process  was  ac- 
celerated by a quick turn toward easing by the Federal Reserve which, 
together with the recession, replaced capital losses on recently acquired 
bonds with gains. Banks were helped to appreciate the usefulness of bond 
price fluctuations by tax provisions (not phased out until the 1970s)  that 
allowed  net security losses  in any year to be deducted from operating 
profits, while net gains were taxed at only the capital gains rate. Like the 
pulling of  a tooth, the credit crisis of spring 1953,  though painful, was 
quickly forgotten by the patient-but  not by the Treasury, which ventured 
only three more long-term bond issues over the next ten years and these 
only when Federal Reserve policy was aggressively expansionary. This, 
then, was the first in a long  series of  encounters to be recited here in 
which, each time, the authorities were more alarmed than the public by 
the consequences of their actions. 
The  nation's banking system thus entered the  1954-57  business ex- 
pansion still shackled in its ability to compete for deposits, but freed of its 
fear of  selling  government securities. Indeed,  lending institutions now 
became eager to replace these securities with private loans bearing higher 
yields. These were the years in which, abruptly, the typical automobile 
installment loan term lengthened from two years to three (at lower down Albert M. Wojnilower  283 
payments)  and mortgage terms for a while eased to the extent that in 
parts of the country no-down-payment and "no-no-down-payment" (clos- 
ing costs included in the loan)  mortgages were advertised. The question 
was how low liquidity considerations would permit government security 
portfolios to sink.  (Keep  in mind that banks had no important way to 
borrow in the money market.) As usual, the prognostications of recession 
set in prematurely, particularly as business borrowing to finance a plant 
and equipment boom began to crowd out mortgage and automobile credit 
in  1956.  Banks reduced their government securities holdings about 20 
percent between the beginning and end of the expansion. Interest rates 
rose, but with the prime loan rate peaking at 4?/2 percent (and the quar- 
terly GNP deflator at 4.7 percent)  it seems unlikely that price rationing 
through higher interest rates played any important role in curbing de- 
mand. On  the other hand,  as  the  expansion  drew toward its close  in 
August  1957,  there were many reports of  nonprice rationing of credit. 
Financial pressure was intensified by "unexpected curtailment in defense 
payments and changes in procurement policies  . . . to avoid exceeding 
budget estimates and the debt ceiling, [which] had an unsettling effect on 
business in early autumn." In other words, the federal government for a 
time stopped paying some of its bills.2 Just when credit was becoming 
tight, many  firms were  forced  into  unplanned  borrowings from  their 
banks. Although an acute sense of credit stringency developed, no terri- 
bly threatening shock to the financial system occurred, so that the 1957 
crest in business might be labeled the last "gentle" upper cyclical turning 
point. 
With no crisis having intervened, the next cycle was in effect a replay. 
Financial institutions soon  considered their liquidity replenished (as  in 
1953-54,  the Federal Reserve moved to "aggressive ease," with Treasury 
bill rates dropping well below  1 percent),  and the whole process began 
to repeat, faster. The economy appeared to be more inflation-prone, and 
the Federal Reserve more willing to exercise restraint. It took only five 
quarters, compared with ten in the previous cycle,  for the government 
securities holdings of banks to shrink about 20 percent. In more modern 
fashion, interest rates rose more sharply and for the first time provoked 
a degree of disintermediation. Large commercial banks had begun to de- 
velop a time-deposit market. but they lost substantially all interest-sensi- 
2.  Board  of Governors  of the Federal Reserve  System,  44th  AnnuIiiial  Report,  1957, 
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tive balances as Treasury bill rates rose above the 3 percent Regulation Q 
ceiling on time-deposit interest rates. More important, the Treasury's is- 
suance in October 1959 of the "Magic fives" (five-year notes carrying a 
5 percent coupon)  prompted the startling spectacle of  lines of  people 
around banking institutions withdrawing deposits and around the Federal 
Reserve Banks subscribing for the new notes. 
These developments triggered a sharp increase in desired liquidity and 
retrenchment of credit offerings on the part of the financial sector. The 
consequent onset of recession in the economy was delayed to April 1960 
only by the anticipation and realization of the massive rebound in steel 
buying and output that was to follow  the July-November  1959  strike, 
which was not finally settled until January 1960. 
Here, then, was a case in which severe credit stringency had developed 
not because any general rise in interest rates deterred borrowers, but be- 
cause particular rates had been forced to remain in place by regulation 
while  others rose. As  a result, important financial institutions and de- 
pendent customers were put in jeopardy of insolvency. Who knows how 
much higher interest rates might have escalated even as far back as 1959 
if banks and thrift institutions had been allowed to leapfrog their deposit 
interest rates above  Treasury yields. Few  such concerns then troubled 
either the authorities or the public. The moral drawn from the experience 
was  a quite different one:  disintermediation leads  to recessions.  As  in 
1953,  the authorities had frightened themselves. They acquired a deep- 
seated fear of disintermediation-and  market participants knew it. 
The 1960s-Certificates  of Deposit, Eurodollars, and Liability 
Management 
For the large commercial banks the continuing restrictions on  their 
ability to bid for deposits were becoming onerous. The banks were hav- 
ing difficulty keeping up with their major clients. As these clients evolved 
into  national  and  international concerns  with  greatly expanded credit 
requirements, they  had to  turn to  an ever widening  circle of  banking 
sources because the growth of their "lead" banks remained essentially de- 
pendent  on  narrow local  deposit  markets. It  was  in  response  to  such 
pressures that in early  1962  the negotiable certificate of deposit  (CD) 
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cial practice. It is little wonder that several econometric studies concerned 
with the relations among financial aggregates, inflation, and interest rates 
detect-or  are clouded by-a  break of continuity in the early 1  960s. 
The new instrument-which  from the standpoint of the buyers was es- 
sentially a high-quality, more flexible, and higher yielding type of Treasury 
bill-suddenly  enabled well-known banks to bid for deposits all over the 
world. At a price, funds would always be available. If a loan or security 
was available at a good rate anywhere in the world, it was profitable to 
acquire it, and to do so promptly before it was snapped up by another of 
what justly came to be called the universal banks. 
What were the perceived risks? Were they credit defaults? These had 
been minimal for decades; now that governments had demonstrated their 
ability and political determination to prevent severe recessions, they were 
likely to be even fewer. Were they adverse rate movements? Short-term 
rates (the cost of CD money)  had almost always been less, and usually 
by a large margin, than the corporate bond yields to which the prime-loan 
rate was informally pegged. The rate of return on consumer loans, mort- 
gages, and tax-exempt bonds was of course well  above the prime rate. 
The  only  conceivable  danger was  that as in  1959  the ceilings  on  the 
Regulation Q time-deposit interest rate might again become binding, but 
this contingency seemed remote at a time when the authorities had their 
hands full trying, for international reasons, to keep the bill rate from fall- 
ing below 21/2  percent; in 1961, it may be recalled, the "bills only" policy 
in open-market operations was abandoned for this very reason. Indeed, the 
ceilings may have been viewed positively, as firm assurance that the cost 
of CD funds could never exceed the revenues from the assets in which 
they were invested. The chief risks were posed to banks unable or unpre- 
pared to join the rush to expansion-both  their deposit and their loan 
customers would be competed away. 
Confirming that credit growth had all along been held in check mainly 
by institutional rigidities, the new approach revealed an enormous pent- 
up credit demand and supply. Over the four years beginning early 1962, 
bank holdings of  business-type loans,  consumer credit, and mortgages 
grew at an annual rate of over 13 percent, and holdings of municipal bonds 
at a 16 percent rate, far in excess of the 7 percent growth rate in nominal 
GNP. Yet during the same period, indeed for over five years from August 
1960 to December 1965, the prime rate remained unchanged at 41/2  per- 
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credit that enabled a none-too-robust economy to plough through, without 
recession, the shocks of the Pittsburgh-Washington  steel-price confronta- 
tion and the stock market crash of spring 1962. 
The banks had always served as lenders of last resort to the rest of the 
financial community, while the Federal Reserve, although disciplining the 
use of the discount window, acted as lender of last resort to the banks. 
Both relations were profoundly altered by the introduction of CDs. Com- 
pared to other financial institutions, the role of the banks was greatly en- 
larged. It now made sense for banks to open much larger credit lines for 
other  lenders-thrift  institutions,  insurance  companies,  finance  com- 
panies-to  finance these lenders in the acquisition of such loans as the 
banks themselves were not yet able or anxious to make. Although these 
other  institutions  lacked  the  potentially  infinite borrowing power  be- 
stowed by CDs, they could utilize it indirectly through the banks. In their 
competitive zeal the banks also nurtured the epidemic growth of the com- 
mercial paper market, even though their generosity in granting the secur- 
ing credit lines on which that market then depended came at the expense 
of their own loan business.3 
The relation of the large banks to the Federal Reserve was altered in 
that the large banks now perceived CD borrowing rather than discount- 
window  borrowing as  their credit  recourse of  last  resort.  Unless  the 
authorities were willing to apply the rude club of rate ceilings, CD bor- 
rowing was much more difficult to discipline than the discount window. 
As  this became understood, the banks increasingly took  control of  the 
lender-of-last-resort function, to the extent that in recent times it has not 
been far from the truth to regard the Federal Reserve Banks as branches 
of the large commercial banks. But that is getting ahead of the story.4 
Every year from 1962 to 1964,  an increasingly reluctant Federal Re- 
3. As  the years pass, backup bank lines are playing a  declining role  in the 
commercial paper market, and the market may eventually dispense with them. This 
would be somewhat analogous to the evolution of  the Eurodollar market, which 
might never have been created if it were not for the Regulation Q ceilings in the 
United States, but which once entrenched  was completely viable even after the ceil- 
ings were abolished. 
4.  This is what Hyman P. Minsky refers to as monetization of private liabilities. 
The thrust of this paper is very much in the spirit of his work, which teaches that 
the U.S. economy is tending toward ever greater "financial  fragility." See, for ex- 
ample, his Johln Maynard Keynes (Columbia University Press, 1975), particularly 
chapters  2 through  4, or "A Theory of Systemic Fragility"  in Edward  I. Altman and 
Arnold  W.  Sametz,  eds.,  Financial  Crisis: Institiutions and Markets  in  a Fragile  En- 
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serve Board allowed one increase in the Regulation Q ceilings for CDs. 
Repeatedly in the nick of time, the authorities raised the ceilings (although 
sometimes in a manner that created a term structure of CD rates virtually 
guaranteeing holders a "riding-the-yield-curve" profit and thus actually 
increasing the demand).  In late 1965, in a "showdown" with the banks, 
the Federal Reserve again blinked first and lifted the rate ceiling for all 
CD maturities to 5?/2 percent. As banks pressed CDs on the market, this 
meant that rates on Treasury bills and other federal agency short-term 
securities were, as in  1959, pulled up to levels that threatened disinter- 
mediation of  thrift institution accounts on  which the rate ceilings had 
remained, since 1962, at 4 percent. With the inflationary pressures in the 
economy mounting (largely because of the intensification of the Vietnam 
War), the Federal Reserve saw itself with a "Hobson's choice." If the CD 
ceilings were raised further, the thrift institutions would be rapidly disin- 
termediated to  the particular detriment of  the housing industry; if the 
ceilings were kept locked  in place,  the commercial banks, too,  would 
suffer the burden of withdrawals as the public moved its funds from de- 
posits into short-term federal obligations. 
The bankers were not worried. The Federal Reserve had always backed 
down before. From today's longer and sadder perspective, however, it is 
not surprising that the decision went in favor of  the housing industry, 
especially when,  then much as now,  a decline in housing construction 
was widely viewed as a certain trigger to a general recession. This time the 
CD rate ceiling was held in place. 
The outcome was the notorious "credit crunch" of August-September 
1966.  (It  was then, I believe,  that the label "crunch" was first used.) 
Banks that relied almost entirely on liability management faced the ap- 
parent inevitability of  massive distress sales of  long-term assets into a 
paralyzed marketplace. Lending to all but the most established and neces- 
sitous customers was halted abruptly. Chief executives of leading banks 
reportedly were humbled to the point of pleading with their counterparts 
in industry to renew their CDs. Soon the gravity of the situation pene- 
trated to an initially incredulous Federal Reserve. A fist-in-glove letter 
was issued in effect inviting to the discount window those banks that "be- 
haved" by refraining both from selling securities and from making new 
business loans.5 Other banks, it was implied, would be cut off. Publication 
of the letter laid to rest the very lively fears that major banks might have 
5. The letter was released to the public on September 1, 1966. See the Federal 
Reserve  Builletini,  vol. 52 (September 1966), pp. 1338-39. 288  Brookings PaDers on Economic  Activity,  2:1980 
to close their doors. Nevertheless, the double-edged impact of that letter 
came too late from the standpoint of  official intentions to forestall the 
decline in output and the minirecession that promptly arrived before year- 
end. 
During  this  experience,  corporate  bond  yields  and  the  prime  rate 
briefly reached the then unheard of level of 6 percent. But there was noth- 
ing in the data or in the conversations of the period to suggest that the 
higher level of nominal interest rates had played any significant role in 
limiting the quantity of credit demanded, obtained, or spent. 
Although the duration of the crunch was short and the adverse cyclical 
consequences mild, the experience prompted many of the participants to 
far-reaching conclusions  and responses. The Federal Reserve appeared 
particularly startled and shaken by the brush with apparent disaster, as 
shown by a long-lasting series of private and public reassurances that no 
such crisis would ever be permitted to recur. In the short run, the policy 
rudder was tilted sharply toward ease, pushing interest rates below the 
disintermediation thresholds. The campaign for fiscal discipline as a sub- 
stitute for monetary discipline was intensified. Most important, however, 
was the impetus given to the search for alternatives to flash points such as 
rate ceilings that cornered the Federal Reserve in stark yes-or-no situa- 
tions. The circumstances were ripened for a shift of policy focus to the 
monetary aggregates. 
These changes of official attitude did not go unnoticed in the financial 
community. Once again, some of the banks with the most brazen expan- 
sionary bias had turned out to be the ultimate winners, no matter how 
anxious the moments they might have experienced along the way. Under 
the pressures of the moment, some bankers had discovered the open door 
to the borrowing of  funds in the unregulated Eurodollar market. They 
prepared the groundwork for more active use of this source, which greatly 
mitigated the pressures the next time the CD rate ceilings became seri- 
ously binding in early 1969. 
The crunch also spurred a widespread move toward formalizing in a 
legally obligating manner the hitherto largely informal credit-line arrange- 
ments prevailing between banks and their business customers. Both par- 
ties wanted to be protected from future "antilending" injunctions such as 
that contained in the Federal Reserve's letter of September 1966.  Cor- 
porations wanted and were willing to pay for legally binding credit lines. 
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in a position in which they would have to dishonor such agreements. In 
effect, they were trying to create still more private instruments with mone- 
tary properties. Ever since, the growth of this invisible money supply has 
rendered suspect policy as well as scholarly conclusions based on mone- 
tary aggregate data. Unused bank-credit commitments currently slightly 
exceed the total quantity of demand deposits included in measures of the 
money stock. 
Unused  commitments are in fact  more immediately spendable than 
compensating balances  (which  are included in M1).  They  are closely 
analogous to M,A  (demand deposits and currency):  the owner incurs a 
cost  of  holding  (the  fee),  in contrast to interest-bearing time deposits 
and other parts of  the broader monetary aggregates. Monthly data on 
commitments have been collected only since 1975. Rates of growth since 
1975 of M,A and M1,1  plus unused commitments-an  expanded version of 
immediately spendable balances-are  contrasted in figure 2. They sug- 
gest that, at times of divergence, the more inclusive measure may be more 
revealing.6 
The fresh memories of the 1966 credit crunch made it even more cer- 
tain that the mid-1968  tax increase, over which so much political blood 
was spilled, would be drowned in a sea of credit expansion. Interest rates 
had rebounded to the brink of disintermediation. The tax increase was 
enacted in a climate in which passage was seen as a virtually certain sig- 
nal for  a strenuous Federal  Reserve  effort to  depress interest rates- 
whether because of fear of "overkill" or of some tacit understanding with 
the other arms of  government to  trade lower interest rates for higher 
taxes. In a manner since repeated many times, the financial community 
saw the prospect of lower interest rates-through  Federal Reserve action, 
recession, or both-as  a strong incentive to expand the supply of credit. 
Coupled with the natural tendency of  the public, in conditions of  full 
employment, to maintain or expand its consumption in the face of the tax 
increase, the outcome  was an explosion  of  bank credit. The  crowning 
irony was that fiscal 1969, the only year between 1960 and the present to 
show a federal budget surplus, also recorded clearly the worst inflation 
since the Korean War. In fiscal 1970 the inflation accelerated further. 
6.  By 1977, when such data began to be collected systematically, roughly one- 
half of new long-term  and short-term  commercial and industrial  bank loans, as well 
as construction and land development loans, was made under previous commit- 
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a.  Quarterly  changes  at  seasonally  adjusted  annual  rates. 
That  episode  may be  regarded as  the paradigm for  a sequence re- 
peated (as will be described below)  several times since. Government and 
lenders regard nominal interest rates as "high," foretelling recession and 
lower rates. Thus the supply of credit enlarges as lenders are encouraged 
to  become  aggressive.  Meanwhile,  credit  demand  remains  relatively Albert M. Woinilower  291 
strong. Nominal GNP is at peak levels. Some sectors are still expanding. 
In other sectors that may be weakening, retardations in cash receipts are 
not immediately offset by expenditure cuts; these sectors may become 
larger and necessitous borrowers. In conjunction with a more accommo- 
dative monetary policy, the combination of larger credit supply and de- 
mand implies a sizable stimulus to spending. The short-run result is that, 
to general "surprise," the recession and lower interest rates fail to ma- 
terialize. The long-run result is that the "high" interest rates, by bringing 
about a premature easing of credit conditions and Federal Reserve policy, 
serve as instigator rather than deterrent to the inflationary  process.7 
By  1969  deposit-rate ceilings were no longer a serious constraint on 
banks or their customers, but thrift institutions and the mortgage and 
housing sectors dependent on those thrift institutions were not so fortu- 
nate. As far as commercial banks were concerned Eurodollar borrowings, 
only an emergency resort in 1966, substituted admirably for the CD mar- 
ket whenever it became  immobilized by  rate ceilings.  The creation of 
bank holding companies to issue unregulated commercial paper served 
the same purpose. The Federal Reserve, though well aware of the Euro- 
dollar and other breaches, had learned enough to be careful not to close 
them. Some of the concerned parties recognized that, if the Federal Re- 
serve chose to limit the quantity of bank reserves, this constraint could 
not in the aggregate be circumvented by CD, Eurodollar, or any other 
open-market borrowing-but  the  constraint was  viewed  as  falling  on 
someone else. Few major bankers and their customers viewed themselves 
as individually constrained, and so the Federal Reserve was continually 
faced with stronger business plans and higher interest rates than it had 
foreseen. 
At this juncture, high inflation and interest rates were still regarded as 
temporary,  wartime phenomena. For both lenders and borrowers, the per- 
ceived real component  of  long-term rates had increased sharply. With 
Vietnam peace rumors (implying disinflation and lower interest rates) 
sweeping the markets as regularly as waves pounding a beach, lenders 
remained aggressive even as interest rates soared, while borrowers, as is 
usual when business is strong, did not seem to care. 
The turning point in the financial sector had a different source. Banks 
7. There is also the implication that once expansionary  forces have taken hold, 
the Federal Reserve can contain them only by remaining "tight"  beyond the time 
that will subsequently  be recorded  as the cyclical peak. There is no kill except over- 
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raised the prime loan rate frequently in response to their rising Eurodollar 
costs, foreshadowing the formula-adjustment systems for the prime rate 
instituted a few years later. But in June 1969 they overreached themselves 
in lifting the rate a full point, from 71/2 to 8'/2  percent, in one gulp. The 
resultant congressional outcry carried the message that banks should nIo 
longer count on being able to pass on higher money costs to their cus- 
tomers. The game had been shut down. 
Although short-term rates continued to escalate rapidly to year-end, 
the prime rate moved up no further. Because lending had suddenly be- 
come  unprofitable, banks tried to  reduce loans  rather than to  expand 
them. Growth in bank credit virtually halted. Industrial productioni  was 
declining by Labor Day, and recession was under way by Thanksgiving. 
Quite obviously, ceilings on loan rates can cause credit crunches perhaps 
less abruptly  but just as effectively as ceilings on deposit rates. 
The Early 1970s-Penn  Central 
At  first it  appeared as though the  economic  downturn in  1969-70 
might be  a replay of  1966-67.  But the pace of  institutional change in 
finance was accelerating. In early 1970 the Federal Reserve switched de- 
cisively to a monetary aggregates policy. The ceilings on CD rates were 
liberalized in circumstances that made clear they would no longer be used 
as a policy tool.  As interest rates plunged, lenders' profit margins were 
restored. Credit expansion resumed and signs of economic revival multi- 
plied. But the monetary aggregates expanded more rapidly, too, and the 
Federal Reserve tightened its money-market posture. Thus the market 
had reason to move rates up again and to foresee further  increases. Uneasy 
feelings were deepened by the ugliness of the domestic mood related to 
the Vietnam War. A  Treasury financing (then still conducted with the 
price set in advance rather than by auction)  nearly failed when the Cam- 
bodian invasion began while the books were open. 
All  these considerations were suddenly rendered moot by the failure 
of  the  Penn Central Transportation Company and particularly by  the 
defaulting of its commercial paper. This was one contingency for which 
the business and financial community of  1970  had not thought to pre- 
pare. Heroic emergency measures were taken by the Federal Reserve, and 
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of commercial paper borrowings by companies large (notably Chrysler) 
and small. One of the key measures was the suspension (once and for all, 
as it developed)  of any Regulation Q rate ceilings on CDs of less than 
three months. But even though financial catastrophe was averted, shock 
at the narrowness of  the escape was profound. It prompted an instant 
toughening of credit standards by lenders and a reduction of perceived 
borrowing capacity by business firms. The short-range impact lasted until 
it was swept away by the commodity boom  of  1973-74;  some longer- 
range reverberations still echo today. 
Although the Penn Central bankruptcy followed a long span of finan- 
cial stress in the economy,  it would be difficult to argue that the time, 
place, and outcome of such a failure was or ever will be predictable. Pro- 
longed periods of intense inflation, speculation, monetary restraint, and 
rising interest rates set the scene, but whether and when a weak link in 
the credit chain may snap in a vital place remains very much a matter of 
accident. As a consequence, machinery for limiting the damage may not 
exist or, as in the case of Penn Central, may depend for its timely activa- 
tion  on  energetic public officials willing and free to  take controversial 
steps on the basis of fragmentary information. Credit crunch by private 
accident is much more dangerous than credit crunch by regulatory design 
or even error but, as this chronology of events is designed to emphasize, 
as  crunch by  design  is  ruled out,  crunch by  accident  becomes  more 
probable. 
Recovery from the 1969-70  recession was sluggish, precisely because 
the attitudes of business borrowers and of lenders had changed. Grudg- 
ingly, the earlier widespread view that inflation and other problems would 
vanish with the de-escalation of  the Vietnam War was abandoned. In- 
stead the fear took root, rightly or wrongly, that any resumption of rapid 
economic expansion would also mean a prompt return of inflation and 
related financial stresses, including bankruptcies like Penn Central. While 
household sector credit expansion revived much as before, in the business 
sector both borrowers and lenders had grown more cautious. As a result, 
economic recovery (apart from the statistical rebound due to the end of 
the long strike against the General Motors Corporation)  was sluggish 
while inflation hardly abated. Recognition of this "inflationary expecta- 
tions" problem by the authorities eventually became one of the rationali- 
zations for the price-wage freeze announced, in conjunction with devalua- 
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financial community.  Other occasions  will  arise,  I  believe,  when  the 
dismantling of institutional credit constraints ultimately turns out to be 
part of an undesirable long-run trade-off for price and wage regulation. 
The new incomes-control machinery included the Committee on In- 
terest and Dividends-an  interdepartmental committee, which for a time 
enforced an implicit prime-rate ceiling of 6 percent. This did not matter 
much in 1971 and 1972 while, with inflation and the balance of payments 
"taken care of" by controls and floating foreign exchange rates, the Fed- 
eral Reserve was able to pursue policies that held down money-market 
rates. Of course such policies  also promoted more rapid monetary and 
credit expansion. Coupled with expansive fiscal measures and the stimu- 
lative effects of devaluation, they led eventually to renewed pressures on 
physical capacity-and  on interest rates-in  early 1973. A confrontation 
between the ability of the banks to pass on rising money rates that the 
Federal Reserve was no longer able to contain and the implicit 6 percent 
prime-rate ceiling became unavoidable. The situation paralleled that of 
mid-1969,  including congressional  threats to  impose  a  legislative rate 
ceiling if the Committee on Interest and Dividends  (chaired by Federal 
Reserve  Chairman Arthur F.  Burns)  gave way. But  the outcome  was 
different. 
Floating Loan Rates, a Digression 
Commercial bankers had realized for some time that their 1969 prob- 
lems were apt to recur. In preparation, First National City Bank of New 
York in October 1971 initiated a policy of resetting its prime rate every 
week based essentially on a three-week moving average of money-market 
rates (using a specific formula several times revised since and not neces- 
sarily followed  mechanically).  Other banks followed  de facto if not de 
jure. In this way, bankers hoped to draw the political sting from rate in- 
creases and, in effect, to shift the responsibility to the monetary authori- 
ties. 
The action also fitted well into a larger context. Most nations no longer 
pursued anti-inflationary policies with great conviction. Exchange rates 
were no longer fixed. Abroad, business loan contracts with floating inter- 
est rates had become  commonplace  and bankers judged correctly that 
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shift to floating rate loans would enlarge the total quantity of credit. And 
so it did. 
Interest rates on floating-rate loans are tied, generally for the entire 
term of the loan or loan agreement, to the prime rate (or some other in- 
dex).  Thus every time the floating prime changes, rates are adjusted ac- 
cordingly for a large body of outstanding credit. Data for the incidence of 
floating rate loans  (as  well  as for loans made under previous commit- 
ments)  have been collected only since May 1977. By then about half of 
all business loans made carried floating rates. 
Under fixed loan rates, borrowers and lenders had always to consider 
not only whether the rate was right, but whether the time was right. Lend- 
ing institutions typically "transform"  shorter-period deposits into longer- 
term loans. However, if rates fell, borrowers were often able to refinance 
loans incurred earlier at the new lower rates. Lenders sacrificed relatively 
little by permitting a downward float. When money costs rose under a 
fixed-rate regime, on the other hand, lenders in general were unable to call 
in low-rate loans made earlier. Thus an upward float removed a major, 
conceivably even mortal, element of risk. Under floating rates, if default 
risk is ignored, the lenders' object simply is to maximize their assets, be- 
cause a positive margin on every asset is regarded as virtually guaranteed. 
For some business borrowers the timing of loans also involved a con- 
siderable element of risk. A firm saddled with high-rate loans because of 
poor timing was at a cost-price disadvantage to its competitors. Previ- 
ously, high interest rates at times may have exerted a deterrent effect on 
borrowers not because the interest rate was too high, but because the rate 
was expected soon to decline. Under floating rates this risk, in most cases 
quantitatively small and extraneous to the main concerns of the enterprise 
anyhow, virtually vanished. 
These considerations were coupled with a fallacious form of reasoning 
that appeared to make interest rate changes irrelevant altogether. Such 
changes were held to be mechanically linked to changes in the rate of in- 
flation. But the rate of inflation, it was argued, would impinge equally on 
the borrowing companies' net revenues. Thus, unless the real rate was 
initially set too high, the float was of no consequence to the borrower. 
However, the initial real rate was bound to be low  (even apart from tax 
considerations)  because the major banks enjoyed the primest of credit 
ratings and lowest borrowing costs; they could always choose to borrow 
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ing assets as riskless profit sources and thus were trying to expand them 
infinitely: a loan not made instantly by one bank would be made by an- 
other. The competition among banks ensured that borrowers would have 
to pay only small markups on the low  money rates paid by the banks 
themselves. 
These are still the largely prevailing conditions in the world's major 
business and governmental loan markets. They have been tempered by 
the lesson that as inflation increases, the dispersion of particular prices 
may also increase, so that for many companies an upward floating interest 
rate is not automatically compensated by the inflation of its own profits. 
Nevertheless, under the floating rate regime, extraordinarily violent fluc- 
tuations in  the  interest rate-surpassing  those  recently experienced- 
would probably be required to restore any feeble  cutting edge that the 
cost of credit once may have possessed. 
Insofar as lenders perceive or actually experience reduced risk due to 
floating rates, their need for capital is reduced. For financial institutions 
especially,  the  risk of  interest rate fluctuations has  traditionally been 
among the chief considerations of capital need. The shifting of these risks 
back to the borrowers would imply a possible capital redundancy among 
existing institutions. Microeconomic  considerations would suggest a re- 
duction of  bank capital ratios and an expansion of  risks  (wittingly or 
unwittingly)  in  other  directions.  Both  appear to  have  occurred.  The 
implication is that the frequency of defaults will increase and that conse- 
quently ex ante evaluation of default risk (including risk due to the bor- 
rower's vulnerability to extreme interest rate fluctuations) will regain a 
more important role in the way the market allocates credit. 
The  obverse  also  holds:  nonfinancial business will  need  a  stronger 
capitalization for a given amount of investment. Furthermore, an incen- 
tive is created for new techniques of hedging interest rate risks that bypass 
the traditional financial channels. I  return to  this subject below  in the 
discussion of the financial futures markets. 
The Mid-1970s-Franklin  National 
From February to April  1973,  the Committee on Interest and Divi- 
dends, with its feet held to the fire by various congressional proposals to 
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to the 6 percent mark while money-market rates rose further beyond in 
response to Federal Reserve efforts to curb the rapid monetary expansion. 
But then a face-saving formula was found that effectively removed the 
restraint on  the  prime rate. Shortly thereafter, the remaining CD  rate 
ceilings (on CDs of more than three months)  were suspended. The con- 
trols on bank credit supply were demolished at a time when a large excess 
demand lay waiting. An explosion in credit growth and aggregate demand 
had been rendered a predictable certainty. 
Released from its tether, the interest rate level spurted upward: from 
April to August 1973, the prime rate soared from 6 percent to 93/4  per- 
cent.  Bank credit expansion persisted at an extraordinary pace.  Then 
came a metamorphosis of market sentiment like that of mid-1968.  The 
unprecedented interest rate levels began to be seen as forerunners of re- 
cession. The economic expansion slowed, partly because of disintermedia- 
tion-induced weakness in housing, but probably mainly because of ca- 
pacity bottlenecks in various industries. Possibly in response to the rise in 
short-term rates, excessive growth in the money stock gave way to a brief 
absolute decline, which the market knew would impel the Federal Reserve 
to bring short-term rates down. The market was right about the Federal 
Reserve but not about the recession. An extraordinary pace of credit ex- 
pansion persisted. The outcome was that, although output dipped as a 
result of the Arab oil embargo of October 1973, no genuinely cyclical re- 
cession took place until nearly a year later. 
Admittedly the business cycle chronology of the National Bureau of 
Economic Research shows a contraction beginning in November  1973. 
Most observers probably now agree that this dip reflected primarily the 
oil crisis and its short-run impact on automobile production and travel. 
Once the Arab oil embargo was lifted in March 1974, industrial produc- 
tion quickly rebounded. In early 1974 the view was popular that the re- 
cession was over and that the economy was entering the promised land of 
permanent shortages and double-digit inflation. The genuine hallmarks of 
a broad cyclical recession did not appear until fall  1974. That the econ- 
omy managed to resist for so long in the face of the sharply higher interest 
rates, the severe declines in home building and automobile production, 
the food crop deficiencies, and the oil shock-not  to mention the Water- 
gate political trauma-is  a strong testimonial to the motive power of the 
credit system when the participants see incentives to expand. 
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another pattern that has subsequently become  familiar. A  spurt in the 
money stock above the Federal Reserve's target range triggered a sharp 
rise in short-term rates, which was understood and expected by everyone. 
With the prime rate lagging a few weeks behind the upturn in market 
rates, banks experienced an unanticipated rise in loan volume,  as cor- 
porations switched their indebtedness out of commercial paper into bank 
loans and tilted their marginal decisions between borrowing and short- 
term asset liquidation toward borrowing. The banks thus were forced into 
the CD markets as necessitous issuers, intensifying the upward pressure 
on short-term rates. In due and rapid course, however, the spurt in rates 
induced the further economization of demand deposits. Monetary growth 
was brought within target and the whole wheel began turning rapidly in 
reverse, with commercial paper rates and bank loan demand unexpectedly 
falling, and so on. It is questionable whether any of these developments 
had any significant impact on real output-other  than perhaps through 
the inordinate noise  (vocal  and statistical)  that they introduced into the 
policy and forecasting process. 
In spring 1974,  money stock, inflation, and interest rates were again 
racing one another upward. The chase was halted not by any policy ac- 
tions, but by some dangerous accidents. First and probably most impor- 
tant was the effective failure, in May, of the country's twentieth largest 
bank, the Franklin National.  As in the case of Penn Central, the direct 
impact was quickly erased by a Federal Reserve bailout. But where the 
Penn Central default for a time paralyzed the commercial paper market, 
the Franklin near-default rendered it difficult if not impossible for all but 
ten or fewer of the nation's largest banks to count on being able to roll 
over their maturing CDs. Thus for most banks the making of new loan 
commitments based on prospective CD issuance was out of the question. 
The banks' problems were compounded by the fact that many had set 
up real estate affiliates (REITs)  that had used short-term borrowings to 
finance large real estate  and mortgage acquisitions during the lending 
binge triggered by expectations of lower interest rates that dominated the 
latter part of 1973. The renewed surge in short-term rates brought many 
of the REITs to or beyond the edge of bankruptcy, further clouding the 
reputation of  the sponsoring banks. Meanwhile,  the REITs'  efforts to 
liquidate real estate helped to disable a key link in the inflationary spiral. 
The failure of the small Herstatt bank in Cologne, Germany, involving 
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an international scale. In this case, too, prompt action by the central bank 
prevented the most serious damage but could not equally promptly allay 
the new sense of risk the market participants now brought to transactions 
that formerly had been regarded as routine. 
But central banks and the public, as before, paid a fearful price for 
these lender-of-last-resort operations, which encouraged banks to become 
more reckless lenders than ever. Once the dust had settled, both central 
banks and market participants came to regard such rescues as reliably 
institutionalized responsibilities. It is now everywhere taken for granted 
that no monetary authority will allow any key financial actor to fail. In 
1980 the markets paid virtually no attention to the silver (Hunt brothers), 
First Pennsylvania, and Chrysler debacles, each of which would have had 
traumatic consequences not many years before. When the Hunt news, the 
most unexpected and immediately dangerous of the three, broke on March 
27,  the Dow Jones average of industrial stock prices plunged 25 points 
by 3:30  p.m., but recovered all but 2 points of this drop in the final half 
hour of trading and soared 18 points the following day. 
A  further critical element in the credit crunch of summer 1974 was 
that, at midyear, the banks temporarily gave up their policy of keeping the 
prime rate floating above  money-market rates. Perhaps because  they 
despaired of being able to stay ahead of federal funds rising at a pace ap- 
proaching 1 percent a month-I  have not been able to elicit any other 
explanation, on  or off the record-the  prime generally stopped  at  12 
percent, while federal funds soared on to 13  1/2percent in early July. Thus 
the summer 1969 constraint of negative marginal revenue on new loans 
was reinstituted, producing the same sure and swift curtailment of credit 
growth and aggregate demand. 
1975-78:  Waiting for the Next Recession 
Market participants were left deeply concerned, as they were after the 
Penn Central experience, that a vigorous business revival might lead to 
an early recurrence of the painful scenario of inflation, bankruptcy, and 
asset-price collapse. In September 1975,  when short-term rates were at 
not much more than half their levels of summer 1974,  bond yields re- 
sponded to the rapid business recovery by vaulting back almost to the 
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pace. Indeed, the entire period from the onset of recovery in spring 1975 
to about the middle of  1976  was one in which fears of a recurrence of 
that painful scenario kept  lenders relatively reluctant participants. By 
hindsight, the trend of long-term interest rates was clearly downward, but 
the period was punctuated by and is probably best remembered by bond 
market participants for several soul-searing upward interruptions, as each 
modest upward wiggle in rates was suspiciously regarded as a possible 
herald of doomsday. 
This climate changed abruptly about mid-1976,  in one of those mys- 
terious shifts of financial market style that resembles the epidemic erup- 
tion of  a successful pyramid club. Forecasts of recession came into re- 
newed vogue and remained popular throughout the three and a half years 
of waiting for the actuality. The style of lenders correspondingly returned 
to aggressiveness. Meanwhile, as virtually throughout the period undei 
review, the borrowers "ye have .  . . always with you," that is, there is 
normally a sizable fringe of unsatisfied credit demand that can be actuated 
whenever lenders decide to ease the nonrate terms of credit. In the event, 
bank credit soon exploded. Monetary growth followed. By early 1977 the 
pace of economic expansion reaccelerated greatly, led by the most credit- 
sensitive sectors. The trend of  interest rates also turned upward at the 
beginning of 1977, but then-inverting  the previous relation-it  was the 
frequent but abortive bull market movements to lower rates that became 
the memorable events. 
By spring 1978 enough steam had accumulated in short-term interest 
rates to threaten another serious bout of thrift institution disintermedia- 
tion. This the authorities evidently were not prepared to face. For the first 
time,  they  authorized the  issuance  of  savings  instruments carrying a 
money-market rate:  the  six-month money-market certificate  (MMC). 
The explosive response to this innovation paralleled what had happened 
five years earlier when commercial banks were released from prime and 
CD rate constraints. Now it was the thrift institutions (including smaller 
commercial banks) and their customers who were freed to make effective 
their excess demands for credit and assets. Like banks with CDs and Euro- 
dollars, thrift institutions could be certain of retaining most of their de- 
posits in the face of a rise in money-market rates. The cost might become 
burdensome, but  this  did  not  trouble the  institutions until it  actually 
happened. Moreover, the only way to offset the rise in costs was to acquire 
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centered inflation and interest rate explosion  had been rendered a pre- 
dictable certainty.8 
At that time, as always, the authorities were wrong to presuppose a 
significant interest rate elasticity in aggregate credit demand and were 
unwilling to admit their mistake. The escalation of general interest rates, 
as the surge in the interest cost of savings accounts fed through to bor- 
rowers, was read by government and market alike as a portent of  im- 
minent recession-a  reason for the market to acquire more fixed-rate as- 
sets and for the government to relax efforts at restraint.'3 
Businesses and households, however, were not fooled. To them, rising 
incomes, ready credit access, and the rapid price rise in credit-financed 
assets spoke  more loudly.  Another  whirl launched around the vicious 
circle in which each move to higher interest rates prompts the authorities 
to relax their concern about credit expansion and thus to accommodate 
more inflation (and eventually still higher interest rates). 
The Inherent Weakness of Housing, Another Digression 
As  events have subsequently demonstrated, the reprieve afforded to 
home building by the MMC was rather brief and was purchased at a high 
price in national inflation. The  error stemmed not only from the mis- 
placed faith in demand elasticities, but also from a misperception that the 
cyclical vulnerability of  home building results from a weakness in the 
financial institutions that have  traditionally provided  mortgage funds, 
rather than the other way around. This misperception accounts for earlier 
efforts to use federal agency funds in support of housing finance, when 
at the critical times the financing of the agencies themselves, and their owIn 
8.  In just two  years,  about  $380  billion  of  these  MMCs  came  to be outstanding. 
There  was  also  a  mere  $60  billion  increase  in  the  fledgling  money-market  funds, 
another  aspect of  the revolution  in asset preferences  wrought  by deregulation  of  the 
interest  rate.  Most  money-market  funds  (and  even  a  few  MMC  accounts)  permit 
owners  to  write  checks  on  these  balances.  It  is  hard  to  imagine  how  any  relevant 
econometric  results  using  data  predating  these  new  instruments  can  remain  appli- 
cable. 
9.  The  syndrome  reached  its  epitome  when  the  credit  restriction  package-in- 
cluding  a  1 percent  rise in the Federal  Reserve  discount  rate-announced  the morn- 
ing  of  November  1,  1978,  in  response  to  the  desperate  weakness  in the  dollar  was 
greeted  with  a  continuing  rise  in  bond  prices  by  the  close  of  the  day.  Given  this 
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efforts to maintain liquidity, have always intensified rather than mitigated 
the interest rate and disintermediation problems. Similarly, guaranteed 
Government National Mortgage Association  (GNMA)  pass-through se- 
curities and other mortgage-backed marketable securities have been re- 
markably successful in attracting pension funds and other institutional 
lenders into the mortgage market-so  that now at times of stress, mort- 
gages are offered not only by would-be-borrowers but also by holders of 
existing mortgages and related securities. 
In a "crowded" credit market, as is well understood, long-lived assets 
and homes in particular suffer a competitive disadvantage compared to 
shorter-lived machines. When real interest rates rise, the cost of acquiring 
a new home increases faster than the cost of new machines (and the pur- 
chase price of the existing housing stock declines faster).  To the extent 
that demand for housing is relatively interest-elastic, as is generally be- 
lieved, resources will be transferred out of  the home-building sector.10 
It is at least questionable, however, whether the short-run interest rate 
elasticity of housing demand, especially as modified by housing inflation 
and by tax considerations, is large enough to account for the huge cyclical 
swings in home building. 
However, housing has other important handicaps. A new owner-occu- 
pied home, unlike a new machine, does not yield incremental output that 
the owner can expect to turn into a cash flow to meet obligations. When- 
ever nonprice credit rationing emerges, therefore, machines gain in credit- 
worthiness at the expense of owner-occupied homes. This is another, and 
conceivably quantitatively more important reason why home building is 
doomed to be the first industry crowded out whenever credit tightens. 
An  index  of  housing's competitive  frailty has been  the widespread 
dependence of  mortgage financing on near-money, short-term deposits 
paying below-market rates of interest. It is most unlikely that the public 
would have been willing to substitute longer-term higher-risk, or illiquid 
assets for its savings accounts at anywhere near the prevailing interest 
rates. Now  that interest rates and public access to various near-money 
assets have been largely deregulated, it will become possible to assess how 
important this subsidy to home building may have been. Will the public 
appreciate the trade-off whereby it will earn higher but widely diffused 
10. Such elasticity does not imply a corresponding  elasticity for other sectors or 
for aggregate  credit demand. As an extreme example, consider the case of a gigantic 
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and for most households rather small interest incomes at the expense of 
having to pay more (and possibly incurring stiffer nonprice terms) when 
taking on a mortgage? 
The underlying reality is that single-family homes make no private or 
public technological  sense-enormous  efficiencies in private and social 
capital could be realized if people would live in small apartments near 
their work places (actually in factory dormitories, as once was common). 
However, in expression of the deep human craving for personal space, it 
is precisely this "inefficient"  form of tenure, homeownership, that is heav- 
ily subsidized throughout the industrial world. The dependence on subsidy 
is evidence of the inefficiency. In view of housing's "constitutional weak- 
ness," it is to be expected that freeing the financial markets-which  in 
the United States is tantamount to shrinking the housing subsidy by with- 
drawing preferences hitherto accorded mortgage-lending institutions- 
will reduce home building. Freeing the thrift and mortgage markets from 
governmental subsidy and guarantee is like freeing family pets by aban- 
doning them in the jungle. 
Fighting this reality has meant the prolongation of periods of accelerat- 
ing inflation, thereby promoting the embedding of the inflation in long- 
term wage and other contracts and through various indexing devices. One 
great advantage of the disintermediation  credit crunches was that everyone 
knew in advance that the intervals of intense inflation and peak interest 
rates before the crunch, as well as the crunch itself, would be mercifully 
brief. 
The Crunches of 1979 and 1980 
As  1978  turned into  1979,  most of  the forecasting community-in- 
cluding economists, Wall Street, businessmen, politicians, the media- 
continued to gird, anxiously or eagerly depending on the point of view, 
for the allegedly imminent and inevitable recession.  The  money  stock 
actually fell, but credit continued to expand rapidly. Between then and 
now, two economic downturns were still impending, but both underlined 
the overwhelming importance of availability and the subordinate role of 
price in business-cycle timing. 
The first setback, in spring 1979,  resulted from the sudden reemerg- 
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economic  weakness evanesced  just as soon  as gasoline  became  freely 
available again, even though the renewed availability came at an enor- 
mously higher price. Of course the permanently higher oil prices depress 
the economy (as do higher real interest rates),  but the impact appears to 
be secular, not cyclical. 
There  are instructive resemblances between  the  role  of  oil  and of 
money/credit.  Both  are essential and universal ingredients in the func- 
tioning of the modern interdependent, specialized economy. The propo- 
sitions that "my spending is your income" and "my driving is your in- 
come"  are virtually interchangeable. For  money,  the  law  forbids  any 
substitute, although the law can be and to some extent is circumvented. 
For oil, and particularly gasoline, there are virtually no short-run substi- 
tutes. For both money and oil, output is monopolistically controlled by a 
central authority, be  it  the  Federal  Reserve  or  OPEC,  that does  not 
operate on any simple short-run profit motive. Not surprisingly,  therefore, 
exogenous shifts in the supply of oil and money have similar consequences 
and much can be learned from one about the other.11  In the context of 
this paper, what is noteworthy is that on two separate occasions  (late 
1973  and early  1979)  the U.S.  economy  in the advanced, supposedly 
vulnerable stages of cyclical expansion was garroted by a severe unan- 
ticipated constriction of oil supply, immediately responded with a sizable 
decline in aggregate output, but instantly revived once the shortage ended 
despite enormous and largely permanent price increases in the universal 
quantity, oil. 
In these "experiments" the economy replicated its behavior to mone- 
tary restraint and crunches. Higher interest rates have had little cyclical 
impact. Only crunches have brought cyclical downturns, and these have 
been brief as long as no deep institutional damage was done. This is not 
surprising; in contrast to the oil situation, the political authority that oc- 
casionally permits a credit shortage is under our own control and can 
safely be expected to undo the shortage and bring down the price rather 
promptly. 
In the 1979 episode, the fact that the macroeconomic consequences of 
11. For example, the consequences of beliefs that the real oil price will undergo 
a never-ending rise are analogous to those that would occur if real interest rates 
were expected to be rising forever. In both cases, for expansionary  macroeconomic 
policies to be effective, they must inflate the prices of other items so rapidly that oil 
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Figure 3.  Credit Commitments of Banks, January 1975 through July  1980a 
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the  gasoline  shortage  were  widely  misread  as  a  "genuine" recession 
prompted reactions in the private market and by officials that promoted a 
veritable credit eruption. For  total  loan  commitments  at  large banks 
(shown in figure 3),  the growth rate accelerated to a seasonally adjusted 
annual rate on the order of 20 percent in each of the first three quarters of 
1979, and 24 percent in the fourth. The increase in these loan commit- 
ments relieved companies  of  any  serious  concern  about  a  scarcity of 
spendable funds. The October 1979 spurt in interest rates and change in 306  Brookings Papers on Economic  Activity,  2:1980 
the Federal Reserve's mode of operation to reserve targets exerted no per- 
ceptible retarding influence. (An  exception was the mortgage sector, but 
only because usury ceilings came into play in several important states until 
they were suspended and, more recently, in effect abrogated under federal 
law.)  In the first quarter of  1980,  with possible  anticipation of  credit 
controls  becoming  more  of  a  factor, the  growth rate of  commitments 
accelerated to 41 percent. Even after mid-1980  when interest rates had 
come down sharply from the convulsive peaks and were rising again, the 
chief concern of financial intermediaries appeared to remain how to lock 
in what were still regarded as transitory high rates. In my view, no con- 
ventional recession would have developed in 1980 until it was triggered 
by  a sufficiently severe repeat of  a Penn Central or Franklin National 
calamity-were  it not for a new type of credit crunch that was introduced, 
abruptly and probably largely unintentionally, by the Federal Reserve 
credit control measures of March 14.12 
The shock to the economy from these measures primarily reflected two 
novel features of credit control. First, marginal reserve requirements  were 
imposed on nonbank consumer credit lenders, who had not experienced 
any official regulation since the Korean War almost thirty years before.13 
The impact was much more than psychological, however. Because of the 
jump in short-term money rates to the 20 percent range, most of these 
lending institutions were already suffering negative marginal revenue on 
new loans,  inasmuch as ceilings set by state usury laws generally pre- 
vented full pass-through of  these costs. Until March 14, the prevailing 
view among major consumer finance companies had been that these high 
money costs were transitory, and that the way to gain market share was to 
lend aggressively when competitors might be falling by the wayside. Now 
these institutions were persuaded, much as were the commercial banks in 
mid-1974,  that a lending curtailment was going to be enforced no mat- 
ter what happened. Because lending entailed out-of-pocket losses anyway, 
their response was immediate. 
Second, in the commercial bank sector, the setting of loan growth ceil- 
ings spread alarm among borrowers and lenders alike. Although the an- 
nual percentage increases permitted were designed to be reasonably com- 
12.  For  a  description  of  these  measures,  see  Federal  Reserve  Biulletin, vol.  66 
(April  1980),  pp.  3 14-18. 
13. The "truth-in-lending"  regulation  is more recent in origin, but is of a different 
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fortable, no one could feel secure about this so early in the year, espe- 
cially in view of the multibillion spurt in formal credit commitments writ- 
ten just previously. From the point of view of borrowers, their  'credit 
crunch insurance"-effectively,  their precautionary money  balances- 
had just been wiped out. If one's bank was beyond its ceilings, commit- 
ments might not be honored. From the point of  view of  the banks, it 
became urgent to cut other lending so  as to  manage if called upon to 
honor the legally binding commitments. Consumer loans were the "cheap- 
est" loans to curtail because they were currently unprofitable and because 
they did not involve long-term customer relations. So the lending win- 
dows suddenly closed, much as had the gasoline stations a year earlier, 
and with parallel consequences. In case after case, business contacts re- 
ported, often in the identical language, that instantly after March 14 it 
was as though "the curtain came down."14 
After mid-1976, when the personal saving rate first dropped below the 
6 percent of disposable income that observers had somehow come to re- 
gard as a threshold, the forecast of an imminent consumption-led reces- 
sion was voiced widely. These views failed to give proper weight to the 
supply side of the credit market. To be sure, the savings rate had risen and 
recessions had followed  in earlier periods of high interest rates, as the 
high rates induced some  shift of  consumer purchases from tangible to 
financial assets. But the main story of those periods, I believe, was the 
accompanying nonprice curtailment of credit supply to households-par- 
ticularly of mortgage credit but usually of security and consumer credit 
as well.15  In 1980 it was the "crunching"  of consumer credit between state 
usury ceilings and the new Federal Reserve regulations that precipitated 
the recession. 
Already the aftermath is  assuming familiar outlines. A  brief crunch 
prompted a sharp recession. The authorities soon recognized what was 
happening and undid the climate of restraint. The recession ended shortly 
thereafter. The  crunch machinery was  dismantled amidst implications 
that, having seen its startling potency, future reuse was being forsworn. 
The private sector is developing new instruments which, seen from the 
14.  The  impending  April  15 corporate  and personal  income  tax deadline,  with its 
accompanying  strains  on  liquidity,  magnified  the  impact  of  the  credit  restrictions. 
15.  There  are  also  conceptual  and  statistical  problems  in  the  measurement  of 
household  saving  that  render  it  extremely  hazardous  to  suppose  that  the  current 
figures will  retain their shape under future revision,  or that even the revised data will 
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standpoint of the individual participants, will render them immune in the 
future. 
Financial Futures 
The  most  promising of  such  devices  involves  the  financial futures 
markets. With financial institutions shifting interest rate risk back to the 
borrowers by means of floating rates, a market is opened for a new device 
whereby borrowers may insure themselves against adverse interest rate 
fluctuations. Futures are in fact an instrument designed to guarantee po- 
tential users of a product that they will be able to obtain that product at a 
date certain in the future at a price specified today. Futures markets have 
a major "technological" advantage over cash markets because they con- 
centrate trading in a small number of narrowly defined contracts, creating 
a highly centralized market in place of  a congeries of fragmented sub- 
markets involving different commodity grades and delivery terms. Par- 
ticipants in an organized futures market no longer need to be expert in the 
arcane properties that might distinguish one  variety of,  say,  wheat or 
Treasury bonds  from other closely  related types.  Nor,  as long  as  the 
market functions, do they need to hold or pay for the underlying com- 
modity. Much greater leverage thus becomes possible. 
From a commodities market standpoint, the extension of the futures 
concept to financial instruments represents a perfectly natural progres- 
sion.  Although  the  initial  futures market, in  GNMA  mortgage pass- 
throughs, was established as recently as 1975, futures markets now exist 
and are proliferating in Treasury bills and bonds, as well as (much less 
successfully) in Treasury notes, commercial paper, and CDs. Recent trad- 
ing volume in bill futures (about $14 billion daily in face value) and bond 
futures ($2  billion  daily)  exceeds  that in the cash market.16  It is now 
technically feasible for an enterprise to hedge changes in interest rates 
and to assure the liquidity of Treasury securities and related portfolios as 
far as two years into the future. Just as banks through floating rates have 
16. In  futures volume, each transaction (purchase and sale)  is  counted only 
once. In the cash market, figures refer to transactions  by thirty-six  currently  report- 
ing dealers; thus purchases and sales are in effect multiply counted. On the other 
hand, the initial margin is set at $2,000 per $100,000 in Treasury bond futures for 
some exchanges and at $1,500 per $1,000,000 for three-month  Treasury  bills, so that 
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passed their interest risks to borrowers, now borrowers are learning to 
hedge these risks with the general public through the futures markets. 
As sensible as all this is on a microeconomic scale, from the macro- 
economic standpoint it promises trouble. Wheat, copper, and the like are 
presumed to be produced and sold in response to economic incentives. 
The participants in these commodities exchange markets are speculating 
or hedging primarily against market developments  and random acts of 
God-droughts,  storms, strikes, and so on. The production of new gov- 
ernment securities and the means to pay for them, on the other hand, in 
general responds to political rather than pecuniary decisions. The siren 
song of the financial futures markets is that they offer to banks, builders, 
and all business the immunity to macroeconomic policies of restraint. In 
due course, the authorities can expect to be confronted by situations in 
which, familiarly, the alternatives are a financial crisis or the monetization 
of  these new liabilities  (promises  to deliver funds at a specific price). 
However, as the historical discussion above has shown, in the end sup- 
posed immunity to financial risk always turns out to be illusory, and the 
risks and costs of shattering the illusion may be considerable. 
The presumed insurance offered by the futures markets must be sup- 
plied and paid for. In this regard, futures markets have brought into the 
interest rate arena a new class of participants-commodity  traders and 
wealthy individual speculators. The effect has been to  render financial 
market  prices more efficient (in the economics textbook sense)  but prob- 
ably in a way that reduces the efficiency (ordinary dictionary sense)  of 
the economic system as a whole, which is populated by long-lived tangible 
assets and slow-moving human beings.17 
The markets for securities with fixed interest rates have traditionally 
been dominated by risk-averse institutions. The broadening of these mar- 
kets, through the futures linkage, attracts participants who are much more 
willing to accept risk.18  This is not to suggest that most futures volume in- 
17. Kenneth Boulding's maxim cannot be repeated too  often-that  the "real 
name of the devil is suboptirniization."  We are exerting too much effort "finding  out 
the best way to do something which should not be done at all. .  .  .  Obviously, the 
deep, crucial problem of social organization is how to prevent people from doing 
their best when the best in the particular,  in the small, is not the best in the large." 
The performance  of a tricycle will not be improved by adding a jet engine. Kenneth 
Boulding,  Funi anid Games  with the Gross Nationial Produict, Collected  Papers:  Ken- 
nethl E. Boiuldinig,  vol. 3 (Colorado Associated  University Press, 1973), p. 482. 
18. Possibly the fact that the institutions  are tax exempt or sheltered, while the 
new participants  are not, may help to explain  the difference  in tastes. Z  o  ' S  @  @  @  *  , ~~n  t-  00  W  m  0  0S 
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volves these new participants. To  the contrary, dealers in cash markets 
and professional arbitrageurs  are apparently the major transactors. But it 
is the commodities trader and the wealthy individual for whom the futures 
market has opened a door previously open essentially only to financial 
institutions. These newcomers draw on different types of information and 
form their market opinions in a different milieu. There has been a change 
in the tastes of  the market, reinforcing the ever more prevalent "per- 
formance"  (short-range)  orientation of  the  cash  market. As  a result, 
current and future behavior of interest rates and, in turn, the economy, 
may differ from the past. Interest rates, it may be noted, have generally 
turned coincidentally with or, especially before the creation of the Fed- 
eral Reserve System, lagged behind turning points in general economic 
activity, while commodity prices have tended to lead. It will be interesting 
to observe what pattern is produced by the marriage of these relations in 
the commodity pits-and  what may be the feedback on the real economy. 
The customers get the action they want. In the past year or so,  the 
volatility of interest rates and the volume of transactions have increased 
enormously. In the Treasury and federal agency securities cash market, 
daily volume of reporting dealers in the first half of  1980  reached $11 
billion in Treasury bills and $10?/2  billion in other securities, about three- 
fold the 1975  volume  (see  table  1).  In  1970  the total volume was $3 
billion. The daily futures volume in the first half of 1980 reached nearly 
$1  billion  in the  GNMA  futures market founded  in  1975.  It  reached 
$13?/2 billion  in  three-month  Treasury bill  futures and  $2  billion  in 
Treasury bonds; before  1976  and 1978,  respectively, these markets did 
not even exist. 
When the financial futures markets were launched, most (perhaps all) 
participants regarded it as virtually unthinkable based on previous ex- 
perience that there would ever be "limit" price changes (a one-day move 
of 2 price points in bonds or 50 basis points in bills).  Such changes, which 
in effect halt trading, can have catastrophic consequences for participants. 
In fact, they have already occurred so often that they barely attract notice. 
In the first half of 1980, the daily average net price change in the cash 
market of  Treasury 81/4 percent bonds  due in  2005  (a  representative 
long-term bond)  was over 4%  of a point-equivalent  to about ;  percent 
-more  than twice as large as during any previous six-month span since 
these securities were issued  (see  table 2).  If one had data for intraday 
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Table  2. Volatility  of Treasury  Securities  Yields and Prices, 1973-80 
Daily average  changea 
Six-monith bills  81/4  bonids  due in 2005 
Period  (Basis points)  (Price pointts) 
1973: First half  3 
Second half  3 
1974: First half  2 
Second half  4 
1975: First half  8 
Second half  6  0.31 
1976: First half  5  0.30 
Second half  4  0.26 
1977: First half  4  0.25 
Second half  3  0.16 
1978: First half  3  0.17 
Second half  6  0.25 
1979: First half  5  0.19 
Second half  12  0.39 
1980: First half  22  0.82 
July-August  17  0.82 
Source:  Calculations  by  the  author  based  on  data  available  to  The  First  Boston  Corporation. 
a.  Fromii the  close  of  one  day  to  the  close  of  the  next  day.  Does  not  reflect  additional  intraday  fluctuLa- 
tions. 
of volatility. These are rather large daily changes for a sober market to 
undergo in its opinion of average interest rates for the next twenty-five 
years.  The  daily net  change in  six-month bill  yields  showed  a similar 
surge, to 22 basis points! 
Instruments that resemble options have also begun to proliferate, and 
application is pending for official approval to trade Treasury bond and 
GNMA  options. Because options, in contrast to futures, in essence em- 
body an automatic stop-loss feature (the maximum loss is the cost of the 
option if not exercised),  their speculative appeal may well exceed even 
that of futures. 
The new climate reflects current realities, including new financial poli- 
cies. As recently as the late 1960s, the authorities stood ready to counter 
abnormally large bond price changes; now they have virtually completely 
abdicated any concern. The various ceilings on the interest rate that set 
bounds to actual and expected rate movements have been largely abol- 
ished. Short-run official intervention in the market depends importantly 
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largely random in relation to  the  economic  "fundamentals." Not  sur- 
prisingly, therefore, movements of the interest rate have assumed more 
of  the "random walk" aspects of  other asset prices, and the gambling 
aspects of the markets for securities with fixed interest rates have become 
increasingly important.19  It defies belief that turnover of $38 billion a day 
in just one segment of the fixed-income market is required to fix the ra- 
tional allocation of capital. That so many major financial institutions now 
"trade" their bond portfolios, that is, try to outperform the market on a 
monthly or even weekly horizon, is particularly indicative of a gambling 
mentality, because from the point of view of the holders the total maximum 
return  on the existing stock of bonds is fixed in advance by the nature of the 
bond contract. Interest and principal are given. The game is in the limit at 
best a zero-sum game, and because of transactions costs and defaults, a 
negative-sum game in actuality. The observed behavior merely confirms 
the  strong human propensity,  well  documented  over  the  millenia,  to 
gamble-that  is, to overpay for the privilege of playing a fair game.20  In 
unregulated asset markets structured to take advantage of this propensity, 
one should therefore expect a gamblers' premium to prevail. This, I be- 
lieve, mainly explains the apparently low or at times negative real (after- 
tax)  rates of interest so frequently observed (which turn positive mainly 
after times when the gamblers have had a particularly "bad trip"). It is 
also consistent with the view that in the financial behavior of individual 
economic units, bankruptcy fears far outweigh interest elasticities. 
Thanks to improvements in electronic communications, the financial 
community has been molded into much more of a "crowd." Trading floors 
have always consisted of crowds in the literal sense. Now,  however, the 
crowd has been extended to embrace all market participants who want to 
join, no matter how distant. The video screens that transmit instantane- 
ous  news  and  price  information  are  standard equipment everywhere. 
19. Keynes' famous observation is certainly no less warranted  today than in his 
time: "The  game of professional  investment  is intolerably  boring and overexacting  to 
anyone who is entirely exempt from the gambling instinct; whilst he who has it 
must pay to this propensity  the appropriate  toll." John Maynard Keynes, Thle Genl- 
eral  Thleory of  Employnmentt  Itnterest anid Montey  (Harcourt  Brace,  1936),  p.  157. 
Much of this paper may be regarded  as a pedestrian  update on chapter 12 of Thle 
General  Theory. 
20. It may be that the propensity  to overborrow,  even at usurious interest rates, 
is simply another  facet of the gambling  mentality.  In turn, this frailty of humanity in 
expecting  the future to bring more luck than cold rationality  would calculate may be 
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Traders must and do therefore respond literally instantly to all news to 
which they think other traders might respond. Whether the news is con- 
sidered economically significant or even true is immaterial. Moreover, it 
is well known that crowds generate, transmit, and respond to messages 
(rumors  included)  very  differently  from  individuals.  Thus  accident 
comes to play a large role. For example, a news item that appears while 
the market is open may elicit a much larger response in price, volume, or 
both than one that appears when the market is closed (when the crowd is 
disbanded), removing the carrot-and-stick pressures for instant response. 
Occasions  are commonplace  on which prices move in one  direction in 
response to a news report but fail to move back when the report is un- 
masked as palpably false. 
Volatile movements in the interest rate make it difficult to pursue either 
a purposive or stable monetary policy. Even advocates of a policy dedi- 
cated strictly to stable growth of the monetary base may recognize that 
wide rate fluctuations will intensify the political difficulties of adhering to 
course. Moreover, in a wealthy world there must be some threshold be- 
yond which the macroeconomic wealth effects of  even random fluctua- 
tions in asset prices become significant. Those who advocate less single- 
minded policies will find the market signals needed for policy calibration 
obscured by the increased noise from the larger fluctuations in interest 
rate. I cannot visualize a Federal Reserve of human beings standing at a 
point so physically and emotionally remote that they alone can stabilize 
a financial world that has no other discipline to keep it in check. 
None  of the foregoing is meant to suggest that participants make de- 
cisions other than those dictated by rational self-interest as they correctly 
perceive it, including recognition of the frailty of the monetary authorities. 
Consumer sovereignty reigns.2' In my view, however, this sovereignty has 
such serious negative externalities that financial markets should be recog- 
nized as one  of  the key sectors in which human collectivities see fit to 
impose  restraints on individual impulse. It makes me rather uneasy to 
21. In the case of fiduciaries-pensions, trust  funds, and so forth-a  conflict may 
exist between the manager of the funds who wishes to increase his or her income 
now, and the owner who may be financing retirement  or building an estate to pass 
on to heirs. These days, however, the conflict may be more apparent than real. 
Owners  seem to be apportioning  and reapportioning  funds among managers mainly 
on the principle of "what have you done for me lately?" If owners of funds look 
for managers who have shown above-average returns, they are opting for above- 
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observe that, in most years, the most talented business school graduates 
vie for employment in investment banking and related fields, correctly 
assessing the potential for early and large rewards; while it is left to lesser 
mortals to organize, for smaller rewards, the production and distribution 
of  the goods  and services that give underlying value to the claims and 
securities that the financial markets shuffle about. 
Expectations 
While having repeatedly asserted that expectations of financial market 
participants play a critical role in business fluctuations, I have thus far 
skirted any direct confrontation with the subject. What expectations are, 
and how they are revealed, is no simple matter to define or measure. Ac- 
cording to the experience of public opinion polling, it certainly cannot be 
done with a naive questionnaire. How can one rationalize, for example, 
that at this writing the yield curve of Treasury securities slopes upward to 
the seven-year maturity and downward to the longer maturities-while 
the curve for high-grade corporate securities slopes upward throughout? 
Is there a simple explanation for why the yield on short-term tax-exempt 
securities has never exceeded  that on  long-terms, even  during the ex- 
tended periods during which the taxable yield curve was sharply inverse? 
Why is it that near every business cycle top, experienced observers know 
that a recession is on the way and are poised  to "scalp" a bond price 
recovery even before it starts, yet as referred to above, long-term rates on 
average lag behind cyclical peaks in business. Moreover, this lag often has 
prevailed despite the signal given by an earlier crest in short-run rates. 
That is  surely a curious performance for  a collection  of  assets whose 
prices represent little more than congealed expectations. 
In theoretical models of  asset prices, complications ensue when the 
expectations held by market participants are not independent or identical. 
Yet as I try to illustrate below, the market may be viewed as a collection 
of  overlapping crowds, with considerable diversity as well  as interde- 
pendence of expectations both within and between the crowds. Indeed, it 
might be contended, the effectiveness of a credit crunch or comparable 
overriding polar force is its power to force  market expectations all to 
point in the same direction. 
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risk. Such prudence also  dictates that one's expectations be diversified 
(take into account many different future states of the world) -but  this 
makes  defining expectations  or  measuring them  statistically  a  monu- 
mental task. Moreover,  an economic  unit may respond differently (to 
a questionnaire or in the market) as an individual than as a member of a 
crowd, and different crowds will respond differently depending on their 
horizons,  endowments,  noneconomic  values,  and  so  forth.  The  same 
economic news of undisputed contents is likely to evoke different judg- 
ments-and  even when the judgments are the same, different market ac- 
tions. Accidents that precipitate irreversible change, that is, events as op- 
posed to statistical tides, often assume disproportionate importance when 
they provoke crowd response. My judgment is that accidents in the short- 
run sequence of news and market responses frequently do affect the ulti- 
mate pricing outcome. 
An  obvious  perceptual gap is  that between  public officials and the 
private sector. Many instances could be  recited in which small acts of 
omission or commission by officials, of which they were barely or not at 
all aware, deeply influenced private decisions about whether to swim with 
or against the flow of public policy. Similarly, in the constrained circum- 
stances of  dialog between government officials and private parties, the 
latter may often unwittingly give cues that officials are prone to misread. 
In terms of financial markets, the gulf between the so-called Washington, 
D.C.,  and New  York views has become  almost legendary. Washington 
naturally tends to  think more in terms of  real magnitudes that usually 
adjust sluggishly, that is, in terms of flows and small incremental change. 
New York deals in financial instruments for which the possibility of rapid 
stock adjustment is ever prominent and can force more rapid adjustment 
of real flows than real-sector participants normally predict. But these are 
familiar and superficial (although not unimportant) discrepancies in sec- 
tor expectations. There are deeper and more serious ones, both between 
and within sectors. 
For example, one may surmise that it has been many years since any 
sizable proportion of households has believed that general inflation (as 
distinguished from surges reflecting particular developments such as oil 
price hikes or crop failures)  was likely to diminish greatly for any sus- 
tained length of time. The purchasing behavior of households has surely 
been consistent with such expectations. Similarly, I can attest from con- 
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technology new products, in recent years virtually none has anticipated 
any retardation in the rate of increase of unit labor and materials costs, 
or their own-product prices. Perhaps a few such expectations may have 
been held in 1975-76  and at intervals during the preceding decade, but 
not often. Yet during these fifteen years or so, the conviction that inflation 
would subside (or nearly vanish!)  was often held sincerely and strongly 
not only by government officials, but by influential segments of the finan- 
cial community. The extraordinary rate of placement of fixed-rate, long- 
term securities among all kinds of financial intermediaries testifies to these 
beliefs. Yet  the information on which financial professionals acted was 
the same available to all, and their intelligence and economic understand- 
ing, I would venture to guess at the risk of losing many friends, is at least 
as high as that of captains of industry or the general public. 
This chronic divergence in sectoral expectations is asserted as a fact. 
The explanation offered is conjectural. Financial managers are responsi- 
ble for large agglomerations of paper claims and must invest large incre- 
mental flows. They would have to undergo drastic restructuring of edu- 
cation and habits to change their ways. Any decision on their part to make 
a lasting switch to short-term or floating-rate ("no decision")  securities 
would tend to call into question the need for their expertise. It is psycho- 
logically debilitating to be heavily involved with a product one believes to 
be depreciating. Like manufacturers of large automobiles, financial man- 
agers find it hard to function without genuine enthusiasm. The fact that 
for big institutions, notably pension funds and life insurance companies, 
liabilities in general are not yet contractually indexed has prolonged the 
life span of this form of "money illusion." Paradoxically the fact that it 
does persist, as already pointed out, has played an important role in pro- 
longing business expansions. 
A reverse effect, as already suggested, is at work in the business sector. 
No  company views itself  as able to  fight more than a delaying action 
against the encroachment of  labor's demands. But unless the company 
assumes that the higher labor costs can be passed on (its own as well as 
those of  its suppliers),  it has no  rationale for survival. Also,  business 
firms by penalty of dealing with technological processes, bricks and mor- 
tar, and people-all  of them obdurate-are  apt to be less optimistic that 
current trends can be altered for long. Thus firms tend to see change as a 
gradual process. Those in the financial community, by contrast, live in a 
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almost as soon  as conceived,  and in which a "deal" can almost always 
be struck between conflicting valuations and interests.2  No  wonder ex- 
pectations differ. 
The household sector appears to be constrained to the most realistic 
set of expectations. Households experience at first hand the wage, price, 
and credit dimensions of the marketplace already described. However, no 
stock market surge can suddenly jump the implied multiple on the ordi- 
nary household's income. No easing of credit will enable the household 
to borrow unsecured a large multiple of its income. Most important, in 
financial institutions and large businesses the assets people manage are 
not their own; serious mistakes may mean loss of authority or job, but 
not capital. When households make mistakes, they incur the consequences 
of essentially unlimited liability. 
Individuals in our society have multiple roles, often with conflicting 
allegiances and objectives. Within each sector, and within the units in each 
sector, there occurs a kind of financial diversification of which research 
has taken little notice. In recent years, for example, the household sector 
has  accumulated  enormous  debts  to  acquire  tangible  assets  (mainly 
homes, but not equity securities). At the same time, however, households 
have also acquired massive quantities of short-term, fixed-rate liquid as- 
sets, which at most times yielded after-tax returns well below the rate of 
inflation. Conceivably there were two distinct groups of households, but 
anecdotal evidence and the sheer mass of funds involved argue strongly 
to the contrary. Were these households foolish or uninformed? Neither is 
likely; the evidence  is clear that shifts of  yield differentials among the 
liquid assets produced large investment shifts. A possible rationalization 
is that the acquisition of illiquid assets (homes)  with inflexible payment 
schedules (mortgages) is properly matched with an enlarged and inelastic 
precautionary demand for liquid assets. But if so, predicting the macro- 
economic responses of the household sector takes on dimensions to which 
most forecasters have not paid much attention. 
The ambivalence in expectations about the interest rate is even more 
profound and puzzling within the business sector. With respect to  the 
maturity distribution of  corporate borrowing, one may observe a para- 
dox  that holds  to  a quite  useful  approximation:  in herd-like fashion, 
22.  Perhaps that is why grossly premature  reports of peace in Vietnam, Iran's 
release of the hostages, and similar implausible rumors have such large echoes in 
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corporations tend to borrow most heavily at the maturity with the highest 
interest rate. When short-term rates are low relative to long-term rates, 
corporations expect both rates to rise; when short-term rates are high, 
they expect both to fall. Such expectations are in accord with the empiri- 
cal  history of  covariance in  short-term and long-term rates  (although 
nothing in expectations theory relates the slope of the yield curve to an- 
ticipations of change in long rates). 
Because short-term rates have been low mainly during and immediately 
after recessions, firms have had only  a few brief spans since the early 
1960s that they considered propitious for the issuance of long-term bonds. 
Most of the time they were deferring long-term finance while waiting for 
interest rates to peak, with the intent of issuing long-term bonds at the 
recession trough expected to follow sometime after the peak. But because 
the recessions and peaks in interest rates chronically took  longer than 
expected to arrive and because the long-range trend of interest rates was 
strongly upward, considerably higher rates had to be paid after the peak 
than if the borrowing had been done earlier. (There was also some ten- 
dency to rush in prematurely after the peak, before bond yields had the 
full opportunity to decline.)  That this sort of mistake was made by some 
firms some of the time is not surprising, but it is remarkable that it has 
been so persistently repeated in the aggregate. 
The  phenomenon  is  illustrated in  figure 4  for  the  1962-80  period 
when the behavior I am describing was most marked, using aggregate data 
for nonfinancial corporations. The dashed line is a measure of the cor- 
poration's gain or loss  with respect to the interest rate from deferring 
issuance of long-term bonds. In general this measure (whose construction 
is described in detail below)  would rise if interest rates were about to fall: 
in such circumstances it would pay the issuer to wait. Conversely, when 
rates are on the way up, the measure declines: now postponement of an 
issue will be costly. The solid line is the actual proportion of net corporate 
external financing that in fact took the form of bonds.23 
The figure shows a predominance of "wrong" decisions. Long spans of 
time occurred when corporations would have been well advised to float 
bonds heavily but failed to do so; and there were other times, particularly 
23. Total external financing is net funds raised through corporate bonds, bank 
loans (not elsewhere classified), banker's acceptances, and commercial paper, as 
defined in the Federal Reserve's  flow-of-funds  accounts. The data used in the figure 
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Figure  4. Gain and Loss from Deferring  Bond Issuance  Compared  with Proportion  of 
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in the  1970s,  when those firms jumped prematurely into the fire. This 
impression is confirmed by a regression on the  (unsmoothed)  data for 
the  period  1962:1  through  1979:3,  explaining  the  proportion  of  net 
bonds in corporate external financing by the gain from deferral. The re- 
gression shows the "wrong" sign on deferral, with a t-statistic of 3.8.24 
The measure of gain or loss through deferral requires explanation. It 
is the difference between a long-term and a short-term rate. The long- 
term rate is the yield on twenty-year Treasury bonds held for one year 
forward from the date shown. The one-year span is a crude proxy for the 
common corporate attitude of  "wait till after rates have peaked." The 
holding-period yield is, of course, also the cost to the issuer. The short- 
term rate is the average three-month Treasury bill rate over the same one- 
year span,25 the cost  of  the alternative-to  borrow for the short-term. 
The difference between these two rates, then, is a measure of the gain or 
loss the issuer incurred by deferring long-term borrowing for a year. 
The peculiar corporate response pattern appears to reflect a conflict 
within large firms. For a decade or more, virtually without exception, the 
many internal corporate plans to which I have been privileged to have 
access  (usually through verbal description by the chief financial officer 
or higher) have extrapolated, as mentioned above, a moving average of 
recent inflation rates of costs and product prices. Most of the time, how- 
ever, the interest rates assumed in the plan were below the current long- 
term rate and less than the expected inflation rate. Sometimes the infla- 
tion and rate assumptions came from different parts of the firm, having 
been melded into the corporate plan at the highest executive levels. Not 
too  infrequently, however,  the conflicting assumptions came from one 
group or even individual  (including the economists).  On the whole,  it 
might be said, the forecasts of the production side tended to reflect the 
current, usually inflation-biased, state of  mind of  the production com- 
munity. The financial forecast reflected the disinflation bias of the finan- 
cial  community. How  then  should one  summarize the  actual  state  of 
inflationary expectations  of  corporations? How  can  that  multidimen- 
sional sum fit into an aggregate of the total of such expectations of the 
society (or world)  as a whole? 
24. The actual regression  equation is 
Bond  proportion  =  0.81  +  4.4  (gain  from  deferral), 
(3.8) 
k2  =0.16;  Durbin-Watson =  1.5. 
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The  most  interesting case  of  schizoid  expectations  comes  from  the 
financial community, although here my evidence is unfortunately entirely 
anecdotal. That financial managers in their professional capacities have 
had a more optimistic outlook than the public on security prices is surely 
attested by the fact that institutions have continued to acquire massive 
amounts of bonds in the face of virtually continual declines in real and 
all  too  often  also  nominal  values.  Meanwhile  the  public  has  clearly 
shifted its investment mix toward increasing its borrowings and its real 
estate assets, producing palpably superior investment performance. 
In the latter 1960s when the stock market was in the grip of speculative 
fever, this discrepancy was far less pronounced. At that time, investment 
managers themselves bought heavily for their personal account the same 
securities they were acquiring in their fiduciary capacities. They and their 
customers were going to become rich together. 
By  the latter  1970s  this pattern had changed radically. Among  my 
many acquaintances of "money managers," the majority have been em- 
phasizing for their personal account real estate  and collectibles,  com- 
modities, and futures, while as fiduciaries they are continuing to profess 
sincerely their confidence  and  in  most  cases  are investing  actively  in 
securities. As already mentioned, these individuals as a group are highly 
educated, well informed, intelligent, and responsible. 
I would venture to assert that a similar discrepancy between personal 
conduct and professional opinion prevails among high-level government 
policymakers. 
In sum, the prevailing economic  expectations of society are a rather 
heterogeneous lot that is not easily aggregated. Possibly the potency of 
credit crunches and other violent  shocks lies  in their capacity for gal- 
vanizing everyone's expectations  in  the  same  direction. Without  such 
cataclysms,  however,  the  market clearly  shows  nothing  remotely  ap- 
proaching the unanimity concerning the "correct" model of the economy 
stipulated by the rational expectations approach. That approach has pro- 
vided a useful reminder that expected governmental actions are routinely 
taken into  account in people's  planning-although  in truth the public 
and  politicians  have  always  spoken  the  "prose" of  anticipating each 
other's reactions, leaving mostly the economists in need of the reminder. 
Uncertainty and differences of  opinion  continue  and hopefully  always 
will prevail in the marketplace, both with respect to the nature of  the 
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spect to what (probably zig-zag)  course government policy is likely to 
take and its consequences. As  a result, most noneconomists  (and wise 
economists, too)  find it prudent to  diversify their economic  theory as 
well as their securities portfolios. The general acceptance since the mid- 
1960s  of  the  view  that  recessions  can  be  substantially mitigated and 
tamed places the public and policymakers in a kind of cobweb and gam- 
ing relation to one another. 
That relation is further complicated by the mutual realization that "un- 
acceptable" outcomes will trigger changes in the rules. The notion that 
the public would ever voluntarily concur in a single-minded view of the 
economy has the same deep totalitarian roots as the New  Left  slogan 
"power to the people," which asserts that an amorphous crowd can de- 
velop  coherent policies  without  any  kind  of  organizational  structure. 
Those who in fact prevail in such unstructured "town meetings" are the 
demagogues best able to incite the crowd and intimidate their opponents. 
Such ideas are attractive only to those who believe that they are in sole 
possession of the truth and would therefore hold  exclusive power in a 
society in which such truth was enshrined as the national religion. 
In Defense of Credit Crunches 
I have tried to describe here a Weltanschauung, an approach that is 
widely and I believe justly regarded as having foretold, with reasonable 
timing and amplitude on a lead time of six to eighteen months, most of 
the major fluctuations in business and interest rates and relevant institu- 
tional changes in finance since early 1964 when I joined the investment 
banking community. The  technique, if  it deserves to  be  dignified with 
that label, has been to identify the relevant private and official "crowds" 
and their current reaction patterns and to use economic theory to assess 
the consequences of the interactions as the results reinforced or conflicted 
with one another or with aggregate constraints. 
At the cyclical level, the chief lesson has been that rationing by inter- 
est rate (so-called gradualism) will not stop business expansions. Indeed, 
a kind of "immune" reaction has developed to rising rates in which the 
expectation of  recession that those  rises engender among government 
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that prevent recession. Only credit crunches, conceptually analogous to 
sudden gasoline lines, trigger  business downturns. 
After each crunch, however, steps have been taken at private and offi- 
cial levels intended to  prevent even  any expectation of  its recurrence. 
Of all these steps-and  this has been implicit but not explicitly stated in 
the preceding discussion-the  shift to an M1-dominated monetary policy 
has been the most permissive. Since the United States has subscribed to 
a monetary aggregates policy, the trend of monetary growth, inflation, in- 
terest rates-and  unemployment-has  been upward. Others can describe 
better the pitfalls of assuming that variables endogenous in the economy 
will continue their previous roles and relations once they are made control 
variables-eloquently  summarized in  Goodhart's law:  "Any statistical 
regularity  will tend to collapse once pressure is placed upon it for control 
purposes."26  I can testify that to all except perhaps the most indigent of 
the economic actors, the money stock-in  contrast to oil or credit-is  a 
meaningless abstraction. No individuals of even moderate means, or firms 
other than those at the edge of bankruptcy, base their spending plans on 
M, balances, and no bank of any consequence looks to demand deposits 
as an important source of funds. If there were to be promulgated a perma- 
nent zero money-growth target, hardly anyone would regard himself as 
constrained. That is why there is so little political conflict about the con- 
cept and setting of  monetary growth standards (and  also why  central 
banks are so fond of them). But the record as described here would sug- 
gest that only policy constraints that carry a direct understandable mes- 
sage (Uncle Sam Wants You!)  will be effective. 
In sum, credit crunches caused by regulatory constraints on the finan- 
cial  markets have  played  a  constructive  role  in  precipitating cyclical 
downturns ahead of  more  serious  endogenous  bankruptcy crises  that 
otherwise would have ensued, and before the high inflation rates char- 
acteristic of business cycle peaks could become  deeply embedded. The 
constructive effects would have been greater if firm, well-understood, and 
vigorously policed limits on interest rates been kept in place rather than 
removed  after  each  collision.  Market  participants  then  would  have 
learned restraint rather than defiance. The usefulness of rigid limits is in 
creating a de facto community of private and official interest in avoiding 
26.  Letter to the author from Charles  A. E. Goodhart, chief adviser  on monetary 
policy, Bank of  England, September 17, 1980. A  narrower variant that has been 
suggested is: "Any variable the central bank chooses to control automatically be- 
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a collision with the rules, contrasted with the game of "chicken" being 
played now. To be sure, all manmade constraints, like the pegged gold 
price, fixed exchange rates, or a monetary rule, tend to be relaxed under 
pressure, but not necessarily easily or predictably, at least not the first 
time. The time to save the Regulation Q type of constraints was in the 
late  1960s  and early 1970s when they were set low and the public was 
still reluctant to sanction higher interest rates-showing  greater foresight 
than the economists. 
A policy of limits would not compete with but rather would comple- 
ment more traditional monetary policy approaches. Without the Federal 
Reserve's efforts at monetary restriction, the flashpoints represented  by the 
various ceilings on  interest rates would have been reached much later 
when inflationary pressures were even more intense. But had the ceilings 
been taken more seriously, the Federal Reserve's policies would have had 
greater impact long before any crunch. Even today, there would be more 
"bite" from a pronouncement by the chairman of  the Federal Reserve 
that under certain conditions  he  would  reinstitute ex  post  facto  loan 
ceilings than from his promulgation of low M1 targets, which enjoy little 
credibility and which will have little anti-inflationary impact if achieved. 
By no means do I want to suggest that the fundamental cause of the 
inflation of the 1970s was a faulty choice of monetary policy instruments. 
Some considerable inflation would  have occurred in  any event,  but it 
might have been less-and  the danger of a runaway inflation less-if  the 
old regulatory restraints had been modified rather than abandoned com- 
pletely. The fundamental causes of the inflation are noneconomic,  I be- 
lieve,  and  are outside  the  scope  of  this  discussion.  They  involve  the 
changes in the internal and external relations of the United States after 
World War II as it gained and then lost world hegemony. Now  an intro- 
verted economy heavily oriented toward providing domestic amenities is 
compelled, by its loss of geopolitical dominance, to give up a significant 
margin of  its  standard of  living.  This  is  the cost  of  building military 
preparedness, producing the additional exports to pay the higher price 
of oil imports, developing extensive energy substitutes, subsidizing or re- 
placing mass production industries doomed by foreign competition, and 
maintaining the relatively restrictive macroeconomic  policies  necessary 
to  protect the international value of  the dollar, whose  stability is vital 
to our external political influence and to keeping down the oil price. In- 
flation is  a standard historical response for  societies  forced  to  reduce 
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visive internal strife about how the new burdens are to be distributed. 
But  the  lack  of  a  social  compact  for  burden sharing is a reason for 
strengthening rather than weakening the institutional restraints on infla- 
tion that may remain. 
It is presumably impossible to restore most of the financial constraints 
that have already been swept away. This is not the place for nor do I have 
a full agenda of substitutes to offer. The list would include marginal capi- 
tal requirements on banks, outlawing floating-rate credit contracts, puni- 
tive margin requirements on futures transactions, and liberal but rigid 
(not discretionary) down payment and maturity limits on mortgage and 
installment credit. As with a monetary aggregates policy, the rules would 
have to be continually monitored and adapted to keep abreast of institu- 
tional changes designed to circumvent them.27 
How  impractical! But meanwhile, with most legally  institutionalized 
fuses in the credit process having been removed, inflation will eventually 
run on until some new regulatory mandate must be invoked to create a 
bottleneck, or until financial stress builds to a new peak intensity that 
cripples a hitherto untested vital organ. 
The freeing of financial markets to pursue their casino instincts height- 
ens the  odds  of  such crises. With few  bounds  left  on  short-run price 
change, floating rates in the key banking sector, new futures markets, 
large international crowds of participants-and  with a much more un- 
stable "outside" world providing continual reminders of  the futility of 
longer-range plans-bizarre  financial behavior is to be expected. Because, 
unlike a casino, the financial markets are inextricably interlinked with the 
world outside, the real economy pays the price. 
27.  Growth limits for certain types of  credit (a la March 14)  may also have 
some promise. On the other hand, limits on total credit would provoke lenders to 
cease making socially desirable loans (including, perhaps, Treasury security pur- 
chases)  in the effort to force abrogation of the new regulations. Reserve require- 
ments against assets rather than liabilities are attractive in principle, but may fail 
in practice.  Individual  banks and their clients would continue to plan as they do now 
on the basis that reserves  will always be available at a price. Observably,  wide fluc- 
tuations and high interest rates are needed to contain the growth of MI, for which, 
as pointed out earlier, there are many effective substitutes.  Credit  does not have such 
substitutes,  so that rates under an asset reserve regime might soar to truly astronom- 
ical levels. Although a single such experience might well make everyone more cau- 
tious in the future, it seems unreasonable  to expect the Federal Reserve to remain 
tough if necessitous borrowers (including the Treasury) were threatening to drive 
interest  rates  quantum  distances  beyond the spring 1980 peaks. Comments  and 
Discussion 
Benjamin M. Friedman: Albert Wojnilower's paper is both stimulating 
and challenging. The paper asserts a number of  fairly strong and not 
widely held hypotheses and then proceeds to recount the history of the 
postwar U.S. business cycles in light of these hypotheses. The burden of 
the paper, in brief, is to show that it is possible to make a sensible story 
out of reinterpreting-or,  for those who may have been sympathetic all 
along,  interpreting-the  major business  cycle  peaks  in  the  context  of 
these hypotheses. 
This paper is also appealing in several other respects. The history is 
marvelously told here, and the narrative is rich in subtle observations and 
by-the-way insights. It makes fine reading in ways that go  beyond  the 
purely economic issues in question. 
In addition, some of the hypotheses advanced in the paper provide a 
refreshing contrast to  alternative hypotheses  that  lately  have  become 
more  prevalent in  the  macroeconomics  literature, a  key  objective  of 
which often seems to be to make readers feel inferior as they realize they 
are personally incapable of analyzing events with the level of understand- 
ing assumed in behalf of  the representative worker or consumer. Such 
one-upmanship is comfortingly absent from the Wojnilower paper, from 
which readers instead come away secure in the belief that, despite their 
own inadequacies, they may still be able to assess the world more sensibly 
than the actors portrayed in the paper. 
I begin my comments by stating, somewhat more formally than Wojni- 
lower, what I think are the paper's six major substantive hypotheses. I 
then assess the evidence offered in the paper in support of them. The six 
logically fall into two categories:  three propositions directly describing 
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the behavior of  agents in the market economy,  and three propositions 
drawing out implications that follow from that behavior. 
The first of Wojnilower's behavioral propositions concerns the demand 
for credit and its role in determining the economy's aggregate demand for 
goods and services. The proposition is that the demand for credit is not 
merely insensitive to interest rates but, more important, effectively un- 
bounded at all plausible interest rate levels; and further, that much or all 
of this credit demand, if realized or accommodated, is then used to finance 
real spending. The important issue here is not merely one of rate insensi- 
tivity, but instead the potential unboundedness of credit demand. To be 
specific, on a diagram with an interest rate on the vertical axis and a quan- 
tity on the horizontal axis, the idea is not simply that the credit demand 
curve is nearly vertical but also that it lies far to the right of the associated 
credit supply curve at any interest rate relevant for applied analysis. 
The second behavioral proposition, on the role of money, is that what 
matters for real spending is not just deposits held but potential access to 
deposits through the credit market. Hence the credit market, rather than 
the money market, is what is genuinely important in determining spending. 
The  third behavioral  proposition,  on  portfolio  behavior  more  nar- 
rowly construed, is that there has been a qualitative change in the be- 
havior of both borrowers and lenders as a consequence of the prolifera- 
tion  of  loan  arrangements with  a floating rate. The  point  here is  not 
just that something is quantitatively different, in a way that could easily 
be represented by the shifting of  a schedule  (or  even two),  but rather 
that the relevant risk-averse portfolio behavior is now somehow  solved 
in a qualitatively different way. 
The combination of these three behavioral hypotheses leads in turn to 
three potentially important implications. The first is that there exists no 
equilibrium for the economic system, even in the loosest sense of an in- 
terior solution, so that the economy's position is determined by a corner 
solution in which the effective constraint is a finite and volatile supply of 
credit. The true story of the business cycle peak, therefore, is one of avail- 
ability effects rather than interest rate effects, and of the credit market 
rather than the money market. Second, the process of  removing credit 
market barriers imposed by financial market regulation, and analogous 
market imperfections, only renders yet more exaggerated the instability 
of the economic system which is, in effect, searching for the nearest corner 
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rather than credit aggregates, and especially on the more narrowly based 
monetary  aggregates,  is  irrelevant  at  best  and  more  likely  counter- 
productive. 
Much of the basic thrust of this line of argument is at least familiar, 
and the events of the 1970s in particular have given it a renewed plausi- 
bility. Hence I am inclined to be sympathetic at least to significant parts 
of the analysis. In assessing the contribution of the paper, however, it is 
necessary to consider the evidence that it offers in support of these propo- 
sitions and to evaluate this evidence both on its own merits and in rela- 
tion to evidence offered elsewhere. 
The main evidence provided here is a somewhat loosely told chrono- 
logical account of the postwar U.S. business cycle peaks. Its main point 
of emphasis is the fact that, as most people know, credit quantity mea- 
sures and economic  activity measures move  together over the cycle.  I 
have recently worked on this subject and have learned that it is virtually 
impossible to show that there is any more stability in the money-income 
relation than there is in the credit-income relation in the United States. It 
would be overstating the case to claim that the credit-income relation is 
the more stable of the two, but neither is it any less stable than the money- 
income relation, regardless of the specific methodology used to analyze 
the data. 
Although much of Wojnilower's chronological account therefore fo- 
cuses on this covariation of credit activity and real spending activity, the 
evidence presented in the paper is not adequate to make a persuasive case 
in behalf of the hypotheses being advanced. The problem here is not (at 
least I hope it is not)  simply a matter of economists being so ingrained in 
the ethos of conventional time-series data analysis that they are unpre- 
pared to accept any other kind of evidence. For many economic phenom- 
ena-and  the credit market is probably one of them-there  is no doubt 
much valuable information that cannot be obtained from the available 
time-series data. Under such circumstances a researcher might sensibly 
seek an observer to interview as many transactors and potential transac- 
tors as possible during the course of a business cycle, and if possible then 
to repeat the process for the next business cycle, and so on. In many re- 
spects Wojnilower himself appears to have been just such an observer, 
ideally positioned to interview a large number and wide variety of  the 
many people whose actions and attitudes collectively comprise the credit 
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valuable information that economists should be able to use in two ways: 
to provide evidence about economic  behavior directly, and to generate 
suggestions of new ways to investigate the time-series data themselves. 
From the perspective of its ability to support direct inferences about 
economic behavior, the principal problem in the evidence presented in 
Wojnilower's paper is that cause and effect are not well  distinguished. 
The covariation between credit phenomena and real spending is a fact, 
and the paper documents it well enough at a descriptive level. Nonethe- 
less, at the very least a much closer analysis of the chronology would be 
necessary to make a persuasive case that the supply side of the credit mar- 
ket has been the underlying cause of most or all of the major U.S. busi- 
ness  cycle  peaks. The  chronology  in the paper is,  in  too  many cases, 
equally consistent with a reading in which credit supply has simply ac- 
commodated a volatile credit demand, determined in turn by independent 
movements of real spending that themselves remain unexplained. Sort- 
ing out causality in economics is difficult, but at least some progress along 
these lines would be necessary to support satisfactorily the hypotheses 
presented here. 
In  addition, Wojnilower's evidence  is  inadequate to  distinguish in- 
terest rate effects from availability effects. In a number of instances, for 
example, the story told begins when, for some unexplained reason, inter- 
est rates have moved. The movement of interest rates then changed peo- 
ple's  expectations  of  the  future. The  revision  of  expectations  in  turn 
changed the attitudes of lenders in the credit market, thereby shifting in- 
ward the vertical supply constraint so that the economy hit a corner solu- 
tion. It is possible that this chain of events corresponded to the historical 
experience, but distinguishing between this story based on a supposedly 
essential availability effect and a corresponding rate-effect story is too 
difficult a burden to be borne by the evidence introduced here. 
Hence while the propositions advanced in this paper have some sub- 
stantial appeal, the evidence offered in their behalf falls short of making 
a persuasive case that they are true. 
What about the relation between this evidence and that reported else- 
where? A problem which the paper never acknowledges is that other re- 
searchers, who  have  also  sought evidence  (of  a more direct kind)  to 
document the influence of quantity rationing effects on the business cycle, 
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here, in a paper several years ago I tested a hypothesis about the role of 
interest rate ceilings and their relation to loan rationing at commercial 
banks that was very similar to a key element in the story told by Wojni- 
lower; my findings, however, were largely negative. An additional prob- 
lem  that proponents of  hypotheses  like  those  in  the  paper must face 
squarely is that there appears to be so much positive evidence in support 
of competing hypotheses. Why is it that equilibrium stories of the credit 
markets-that  is, accounts of the determination of interest rates by the 
equation of a well-behaved demand and a well-behaved supply, or even 
by an arbitrage relation of some kind-seem  to fit the data so well? Why 
is it that the more familiar stories of financial influences on the business 
cycle, which emphasize price (interest rate) and substitution effects, also 
seem to fit the data reasonably well? 
The difficulty, therefore, is twofold. Researchers who have looked for 
evidence in support of availability hypotheses have failed to find it, while 
those  who  have  sought  evidence  in  support of  competing  hypotheses 
seem at first glance to have been  relatively successful. What would be 
needed to render convincing the propositions advanced in the Wojnilower 
paper is some argument to the effect that most evidence found supporting 
other hypotheses was somehow misconstrued, and that what appeared to 
be price or interest rate effects were really quantity effects in disguise- 
perhaps because there is something inherently unmeasurable about quan- 
tity effects that consistently leads other variables to stand proxy for them. 
A similar argument that might reconcile the hypotheses about the role of 
credit with the evidence on the role of money could perhaps exploit the 
balance sheet constraint across assets and liabilities to show that what 
looked like evidence pertaining to money in reality pertained to credit. 
Wojnilower does  not offer such arguments, but something along these 
lines would be necessary for his case to be compelling. 
In sum, Albert Wojnilower's paper advances a number of plausible, 
interesting and, in some respects, even appealing hypotheses. Moreover, 
these are potentially important hypotheses because, if they are correct, 
they have strong implications for both monetary policy and financial mar- 
ket regulation. Nevertheless, the evidence adduced in favor of these hy- 
potheses is not persuasive. Hence the real value of the paper is likely to 
be to point toward directions for future research. In this respect Wojni- 
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in suggesting ways in which economists who do rely on more direct kinds 
of evidence could find results there that might support the propositions 
the paper advances. 
Franco Modigliani: Wojnilower's paper is both fascinating and refresh- 
ing. It is fascinating because, as an acute observer of the financial mar- 
kets, he provides many valuable and novel insights on the way in which 
monetary policy works through the credit markets, at least as seen by the 
insiders. It is refreshing because, at a time when everybody seems to be 
joining in the chorus in favor of  deregulation and in condemnation of 
credit crunches, he takes an almost mischievous pleasure in building his 
case against deregulation and in pointing to credit crunches as the only 
mechanism that really works. His view, in a nutshell, is that expansion 
and contraction are basically brought about by the rise and ebb in the 
availability of credit, and that once credit starts expanding, only a credit 
crunch can effectively bring a halt to it. 
I find the author's emphasis on the role of credit particularly interest- 
ing because it agrees with and reinforces conclusions I have reached in 
research currently under way on the nature of the monetary mechanism. 
This research leads to a rejection of the standard view that nominal in- 
come is controlled only through the money supply. It supports, instead, 
the conclusion that income can be controlled by restraining any one of 
a large number of nominal aggregates, including not only broader con- 
cepts  of  money  or  liquid nominal  assets, but  also  a  variety of  credit 
aggregates. Furthermore, in a deterministic world in which the monetary 
authorities knew all the relevant behavioral relations, whichever of these 
aggregates were chosen  as a target of  control would be  totally imma- 
terial. There would, in fact, be a one-on-one relation between each aggre- 
gate and nominal income  and, therefore, controlling any one  of  them 
would determine both nominal income and all the other aggregates en- 
dogenously, including the money supply if that were not the target. In a 
world of uncertainty the degree of control over nominal income would 
be different depending on the aggregate chosen as the target and would 
be affected, in particular, by the financial structure of the economy, in- 
cluding the extent and nature of regulation. Research also suggests that, 
under certain conditions,  credit may be  a particularly suitable target. 
This is presumably why it has been so used in a number of  countries. 
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Friedman suggests that the relation between nominal income and broad 
credit aggregates is  as stable, and perhaps even more stable, than that 
between income and the conventional M,  or the monetary base. 
Wojnilower goes beyond calling attention to the role of  credit as a 
determinant of economic  activity. He  also emphasizes in his view that 
what matters is the availability of  credit, not its price. The  demand is 
seen as being very inelastic to price; and if price matters at all it is more 
likely to be through its effect on supply or through psychological effects. 
This aspect of the analysis calls to mind one of the great debates of 
the fifties that centered on the so-called  availability doctrine-whether 
it was appropriate  to free interest rates from the straitjacket imposed dur- 
ing the World War II period. Those  who  opposed  deregulation based 
their argument on the inelasticity of the demand. In essence they argued 
that, with an inelastic demand for  credit, the containment of  demand 
would have required a large rise in interest rates with a devastating im- 
pact on bondholders and destabilizing effects on financial markets. Those 
who  favored deregulation were  quite prepared to  accept  the  inelastic 
demand for credit but argued that the required increase in interest rates 
would have been small-for  even a modest rise would have been suffi- 
cient to dissuade intermediaries from liquidating their portfolios of gov- 
ernment securities because of the capital loss that they would have had 
to show. Hindsight suggests that the availability mechanism may have 
played some role at the time, but at best it was limited both in magnitude 
and in duration. 
Wojnilower replaces the above effect of interest rates on the supply of 
credit and the corresponding capital losses with a variety of other mecha- 
nisms. Besides  the general notion  of  availability constraints eventually 
working on the supply side, around peaks a psychological mechanism be- 
comes important in the behavior of borrowers. At such times, the expan- 
sion of credit comes to an end not because potential borrowers find that 
acquiring assets is undesirable as a result of the higher carrying cost, but 
rather  because they think that other people would want to borrow less and 
therefore there will be problems ahead. As a result, both borrowers and 
lenders pull in their horns. 
But aside from these "crunch"  interruptions in the expansion of credit, 
Wojnilower provides us with no clear explanation of what limits its supply. 
Indeed, one has the impression that, besides credit crunches, nothing limits 
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In my analysis mentioned above, credit is limited either directly by 
the  central bank  (for  example,  through reserve requirements against 
credit)  or by control of some other aggregate, such as M, or the mone- 
tary base,  as generally has been  the  case  in  the  United  States.  With 
limits on M1 or the base, it is hard to see how credit, and hence economic 
activity, can expand without bounds. At some point the expansion must 
be limited by the lack of reserves. Wojnilower does not mention such a 
limit, and one  may suspect that he, too,  suffers to some extent from a 
myopia that is commonly attributed to bankers. All bankers think they 
can expand without limits provided, of course, they can attract liabilities; 
and they may think that liabilities can always be attracted by offering an 
appropriate price or other services. But what one bank gains must be at 
the expense of others. The system as a whole cannot gain more reserves 
than there are. 
At  times Wojnilower seems to suggest that once  credit has been ex- 
tended by the banking system, the central bank is forced to accommodate 
it by supplying reserves in order to avoid a crisis. If this were true, the 
base  itself would be  endogenous  and no limit would be placed on the 
expansion of credit and nominal income. There may be some truth to this 
story, in part because the central bank is, after all, a lender of last resort. 
In  addition, Wojnilower takes the view, which I partly share, that the 
Federal Reserve tends to act in the best interests of the financial commu- 
nity, particularly  banks, and might be willing to accommodate rather than 
face the system with the consequences of disobedience. It also is true that 
the relation between credit and the monetary base cannot be regarded as 
a rigid one. Intermediaries  can, and have, devised a number of base-saving 
devices. However, much of this base-saving requires financial innovations 
which, in turn, take time. On the whole, therefore, I think that Wojnilower 
overstates the ability of the credit system to run away with the ball. At 
least in the short run, the limitations imposed by the monetary base are 
real, even if somewhat elastic. 
Much of Wojnilower's paper is devoted to a history of the evolution 
of the U.S. financial system and its relation to monetary policy. The basic 
thread that runs through this account is that past credit crunches led to 
deregulation which, on the whole,  made the system even more difficult 
to control, thus requiring further crunches that led to more deregulation, 
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complished what they were intended to  do.  But  Wojnilower has  little 
sympathy for deregulation: it increases uncertainty, at least in the short 
run, because it changes the rules of the game; and it has the effect of 
placing increasing emphasis on the price and less on the availability of 
credit as the critical variable of the system. This shift is, in his opinion, 
a move in the wrong direction from the standpoint of the controllability 
of the system. I tend to agree with his assessment of the relation between 
deregulation and controllability of the system, though I am not prepared 
to support him in his conclusion that, therefore, all deregulation is bad. 
Actually,  the proposition that certain types of  market imperfections 
may, under appropriate conditions, facilitate the task of the central bank 
in  controlling  demand fluctuations is  not  entirely  novel.  It  has  been 
shown in a number of cases (including my own contribution)  that when 
the variable controlled is money (or, possibly, interest rates),  then inso- 
far as credit can be rationed by devices other than price, such as credit 
rationing, the stabilization of income in the face of fluctuations in aggre- 
gate demand can be achieved with smaller fluctuations in market interest 
rates and, therefore, also with smaller countercyclical changes in money 
supply.1  The rationing may be limited to some sectors and can be achieved 
by a variety of controls. For instance, mortgages for home buyers have 
been rationed at times of heavy demand for credit by placing ceilings on 
the deposit rates of the savings and loan institutions, thus impairing their 
ability to bid for funds on behalf of that market. This means that the 
remaining demanders had more funds available to them, and thus the 
market could be cleared at a lower rate. Given sufficient time, alternative 
channels can and have been developed; but in the short run it has proven 
an effective way of shutting off some potential borrowers from bidding 
for funds, therefore holding down the rise in major market rates. 
Although I concur that rationing credit by availability rather than by 
price has the desirable effect of reducing the fluctuations of interest rates, 
and hence of lowering prices of certain assets, and probably of making 
the life of the central bank easier, I would hesitate to share Wojnilower's 
opposition to all decontrol. Clearly, the effects in terms of better alloca- 
tion of resources or elimination of oligopolistic  rents need to be taken 
1. Franco Modigliani, "The Monetary Mechanism and Its Interaction  with Real 
Phenomena,"  Review  of  Econzomics and  Statistics,  vol.  45,  no.  1, pt.  2  (February 
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into account. The only inference that I would draw is that not all decon- 
trol  measures are good  ipso  facto  and  that  each  measure  should  be 
scrutinized and judged on its merits. 
One consideration that leads me to emphasize the need for this scru- 
tiny is that my analysis suggests the presumed undesirable effects of de- 
regulation on the controllability of  the system tend to be present only 
when monetary control is through money or the base. But if, as is true in 
a number of countries, the aggregate controlled is a broad measure of 
credit-say  total  credit of  all  depository intermediaries-interest  rate 
ceilings and similar regulations tend to reduce the effectiveness of con- 
trols, while vigorous competition in financial markets tends to improve it. 
The common sense of this proposition can best be seen by an illustra- 
tion. Suppose the central bank decided that, for some reason, it was ap- 
propriate to  restrict credit and, accordingly, through its direct control 
reduced the amount of credit that banks are allowed to extend. Suppose 
now that ceilings prevent banks from raising the loan rate or the deposit 
rate to market clearing levels.  It would then be in the interest of both 
borrowers and lenders to bypass the intermediaries and contract at free- 
market rates above the bank rate, because borrowers can, thereby, secure 
more credit and lenders can obtain a better return. In short, there would 
be an increase in disintermediation, with the result that the reduced lend- 
ing by the banking system may be  largely offset by additional lending 
outside it. On the other hand, with competitive markets, the loan  rate 
would rise to clear the market, while competition between banks would 
tend to result in a commensurate rise in the deposit rate. There would 
then be  no  incentive to  increased disintermediation, and the  intended 
credit contraction would be fully effective. 
An interesting implication of this illustration is that the workings of 
the monetary mechanism are quite different depending on whether con- 
trol focuses on the liability instruments with which intermediaries secure 
funds or on bank credit extended with these funds. One may suspect that 
many shortcomings in monetary analysis and policy derive from mixing 
up the two alternatives. It would be ironic in this context if the attack 
by Wojnilower and the "New York view" against deregulation were to 
make headway just at a time when policy may be starting to lean toward 
control of credit aggregates! 
I am sure the careful reader of this paper will appreciate that its real 
contribution does not lie in the author's provocative attacks on deregula- Albert M. Wojnilower  337 
tion, but rather in his analysis of its operation, as seen by a thoughtful 
participant in the financial markets. The  economy  clearly is  still in  a 
period of transition, and as alternative forms of monetary controls con- 
tinue to be considered, this kind of  analysis and thoughtful account of 
events will be extremely valuable. 
General Discussion 
Several participants supported essential features of Wojnilower's an- 
alysis. John Kareken suggested that the changing distribution of expecta- 
tions is an essential feature of business cycle dynamics, especially around 
turning points when the normally dispersed distribution collapses toward 
unanimity. He also agreed with the treatment of institutional change-in- 
cluding what serves as money-as  an endogenous response to policy and 
financial market developments.  Dwight  Jaffee likened  the  analysis  to 
Irving Fisher's theory of  business  cyclical  peaks:  as the economy  ap- 
proaches the peak, firms' expectations of nominal returns outrun the rise 
in nominal interest rates. Those firms increase their demand for credit 
until the central bank somehow limits its credit availability; then expec- 
tations are disappointed and the contraction begins. 
The role of  interest rates-as  opposed  to  restricted availability and 
credit crunches-in  stabilization was discussed extensively. Robert Hall 
argued that real activity and credit demands were much more sensitive to 
interest rate variations than Wojnilower's model implied; however, policy 
had seldom allowed real interest rates to vary enough for stabilization 
purposes. Hall expressed surprise and dismay at Wojnilower's complete 
lack of confidence in unfettered private markets. Jaffee agreed that policy- 
makers had historically not allowed interest rates to rise enough to level 
off a boom, relying on restricted credit availability instead. But he noted 
that real rates did rise substantially at the 1980 peak; he predicted that 
rates would fluctuate more in the future and real rates would be higher at 
peaks now that housing finance is integrated with the general capital mar- 
ket. Wojnilower noted that, although there might be  some  response of 
activity to interest rates, particularly  in a sector such as housing, real rates 
would never be permitted to rise enough to head off a boom. Even if a 
large, but tolerable, rise in rates did bring down housing starts, that would 
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available to other sectors. William Fellner reasoned that the interest rate 
mechanism has not been a stabilizing factor because real rates have gen- 
erally been low or even negative. This situation has existed because un- 
certainty has dominated business borrowing demands while households 
have had to  accept available low  rates in  order to  maintain liquidity. 
Ralph  Bryant  observed  that  the  growing  openness  of  the  economy, 
through which interest rates affected exchange rates and the real trade 
balance, increased the response of the economy to interest rates, but pos- 
sibly not with the timing that stabilization required. 
Some participants discussed the difficulty of testing Wojnilower's model 
empirically. Christopher Sims warned of major pitfalls in trying to infer 
the relation of financial variables to real cyclical activity. Because friction- 
less financial markets can respond promptly and strongly to disturbances 
while real activity is subject to frictions and inertia, any disturbance- 
whether from real, financial, or policy  developments-can  show up in 
financial market before it appears in real activity. Thus simple Grainger 
causal tests as well as informed study of unusual historical developments 
can be misleading. Sims concluded that the paper may assign too much 
importance to financial developments generating real developments in the 
economy.  Wojnilower agreed that economic  developments often  origi- 
nated in real disturbances, but argued that policy still confronts the task 
of  mitigating rather than  amplifying them  through financial markets. 
Thomas Juster pointed out that Wojnilower's view of cycles defied testing 
with conventional time series methods because it presumes that dramatic 
changes characterize economic  decisions  around turning points.  Jaffee 
noted that it is difficult to identify and model credit crunches because they 
represent disrupted markets in which lack of availability is not easily dis- 
tinguished from lack of demand. 
Panel participants expressed differing views on Wojnilower's call for 
more effective control of credit creation. Bryant argued that the increased 
internationalization of the U.S.  credit market makes it more difficult to 
implement nonprice constraints. Wojnilower agreed, and added that the 
Federal Reserve's role as a lender of last resort for the international finan- 
cial system weakens its ability to pursue domestic objectives. He believes 
that some control would eventually have to be extended to the foreign 
lending of U.S. banks. Robert Holland predicted that the recent evolution 
of financial markets toward interest rate equilibration would continue be- 
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that only a debacle along the lines of 1929-33  in financial markets could 
reverse the trend and lead toward the kinds of constraints Wojnilower ad- 
vocated.  Charles Holt  pointed  out  that if  a system were  dynamically 
unstable, intervention points would have to be established to control it. 
Phillip Cagan argued that quantitative credit controls have never been 
very satisfactory but that there was a legitimate role for control over the 
monetary franchise in the form of reserve requirements on all kinds of 
money and money substitutes. Hall contended that policy should rely on 
changes in real interest rates to stabilize the economy, despite the fact that 
such variations might have to be large, in order to realize the efficiency 
gains from a free-market system. But Kareken responded that since the 
Federal Reserve and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation provide 
insurance to the banking system at prices that are independent of risk, 
there is  no  presumption of  efficiency gains  resulting from  removal of 
quantitative restrictions. Wojnilower replied that the attempt to move to- 
ward a perfectly free market would result in such unacceptable fluctua- 
tions that the political system would not tolerate them, leading to controls 
that were worse than those that he was advocating. 